Statement Dr. Zeid Ra’ad Al Hussein

At the heart of it, however, lies the UN’s flagging belief in itself and its ability to be a peace organization in the hardest of circumstances, and this is perhaps the clearest sign of the UN’s low bow before defeatism. [...] And the willingness of many in the UN to sub-contract, in their minds, the difficult responsibilities of enforcement action to the AU, also speaks to it. [...] From the very beginning of the UN, the Irish, the Fijians, the Nepalese, and many others had done just that—sent peacekeepers into theaters where there was no possible motive for being there other than in the service of the collective will, as the Kenyans are trying to do now in Haiti. [...] Around that time, I told the council that, while we wanted to serve the UN, we were not comfortable being viewed as a sort of underclass of the UN—in a UN divided between masters and servants, a UN stratified between bankers and soldiers, where we would be the only ones relied on to do the riskiest jobs; and especially not when only two out of the fifteen council members at the time were contribut. [...] When there is an emerging or actual threat to international peace and security, the council should mandate, with absolutely no pre-determination, the secretary- general to go in person to the heart of the hot spot and weigh the situation, before reporting to the council with a battery of suggestions.