cover image: Could Israel’s Nuclear Deterrent Support “Escalation Dominance” Against Iran? - Louis René Beres

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Could Israel’s Nuclear Deterrent Support “Escalation Dominance” Against Iran? - Louis René Beres

3 Sep 2024

A key determinant of Israel’s presumptive bargaining advantage would lie in immediate policy shifts from “deliberate nuclear ambiguity” to “selective nuclear disclosure.”1 The success of such shifts will depend, however, on the decision-making rationality2 of the Iranian leadership and on whether Israel fixes its operational focus on the prevention of a nuclear war, either intentional or unintenti. [...] In military parlance, Israel’s shift to forms of selective nuclear disclosure would be intended to ensure the Jewish State’s success in the expanding struggle for “escalation dominance.”12 The deterrence advantages for Israel of moving from deliberate nuclear ambiguity to selective nuclear disclosure would lie, in part, in the signal it could telegraph to a still non-nuclear Iran. [...] In the absence of calculations that compare the costs and benefits of all strategic alternatives, what will happen in the imminent Israel-Iran war must remain a matter of conjecture. [...] The task of theory is confined to the construction of a deductive apparatus, to be used in deriving logically necessary conclusions from given assumptions.” 8 The term “dialectic” originates from the Greek expression for the art of conversation. [...] Still earlier, see: Hugo Grotius, Of the Causes of 18 I Could Israel’s Nuclear Deterrent Support “Escalation Dominance” Against Iran? War, and First of Self-Defense, and Defense of Our Property, reprinted in 2 Classics of International Law, 168-75 (Carnegie Endowment Trust, 1925) (1625); and Emmerich de Vattel, The Right of Self-Protection and the Effects of the Sovereignty and Independence of Nat.
Pages
24
Published in
Israel

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