The views expressed in this paper The overriding lesson from the Somali case is that the UN support office represent those of the author and model can only work effectively if the principal partners accept shared respon- not necessarily those of the sibilities and shared accountabilities. [...] Second, it identifies the tive support office mechanism to Somalia to help major lessons from the Somali case, focusing on the an African Union (AU) mission protect the Somali importance of integrated decision making, the scope authorities and stabilize the capital city, and scale of the support package, accountability and Mogadishu. [...] The report addresses these questions in The first personnel from the original UN Support 1 For details on the broader idea of a UN support package to non-UN entities, see: UN Security Council, Implementation of Security Council Resolutions 2320 (2016) and 2378 (2017) and Considerations Related to the Financing of African Union Peace Support Operations Mandated by the Security Council, UN Doc. [...] Considering that UNSOS was a Fourth, the UN’s framework for reimbursement of political compromise between the AU, its TCCs, contingent-owned equipment (COE) was not and the major funders of UN operations, the result designed to support a war-fighting operation, was a slow-moving and complicated system of although the UN was able to add new items to the resourcing that involved detailed scrutiny an. [...] If the UN were to support a and some of Somalia’s Federal Member States and future AU peace enforcement operation, the UN the attempts by some Somali leaders to politicize would also need to address the relationship the security forces.
Authors
- Pages
- 17
- Published in
- United States of America
Table of Contents
- Executive Summary 1
- Introduction 2
- Today UNSOS is at the center of a debate about how to reconfigure the UNs presence in Somalia as the AU 2
- Overview of the UN Support Office in Somalia 2
- For fifteen years a UN support office in Somalia has sustained two AU missions when the troop- 2
- The first personnel from the original UN Support 2
- The practical issues are whether the UN should offer support packages to peace operations led by other organizations and whether it can do so effectively if authorized by 2
- Figure 1. The AMISOM model 3
- Figure 2. Approved civilian staffing including UN volunteers 4
- UNSOA delivered on its principal strategic task of keeping the AU 4
- Second the expansion of the mandate created a complicated relationship between the 5
- Somalia specifically the 5
- In 2015 UNSOA transitioned into UNSOS in recognition of the fact 5
- Figure 3. UNSOAUNSOS approved budget in millions of dollars 6
- Overall UNSOS received considerable sustained and predictable funding from UN assessed peace- keeping contributions see Figure 3. Nevertheless one practical challenge in an environment as turbu- 6
- Figure 4. Uniformed personnel supported by UNSOAUNSOS 7
- Figure 5. UNSOS flight hours 8
- Figure 6. UNSOS patients airlifted 8
- Lessons Identified from the Somali Case 9
- The support office model hinges on 9
- UN entities. 9
- Integrated Decision Making 10
- In sum all the key organizations need their people in the room where it happens. This is necessary to both build and sustain trust regarding operational details. 10
- Scope and Scale of Support 10
- There were gaps between UN 11
- Accountability and Compliance 12
- The Somali case also highlights the importance of accountability and compliance without which the missions performance and legitimacy will suffer. Peace operations should always operate in compli- 12
- The Somali case also highlights the importance of accountability and compliance without which the 12
- Personnel and Contracting 13
- Transition and Exit 13
- A final set of lessons concerns missions transition and eventual exit. Missions will always struggle to implement an effective exit strategy without a viable 13
- Years later when the AU missions exit strategy finally solidified it revolved around a managed drawdown of 13
- African peacekeepers and transfer of security responsi- bilities to Somali forces. This was agreed upon without achieving victory over al- 13
- Two additional complications are worth noting. First UNSOSs transition tasks were made more 13
- Even if the UN had delivered the perfect package of war-fighting 13
- Somalia alone. 13
- The Support Office Model beyond Somalia 14
- A Viable Option with Limits 14
- Integrated Decision Making 14
- Scope and Scale 15
- Accountability and Compliance 15
- Personnel and Contracting 15
- Transition and Exit 15
- Ideally the UN would not provide a support package under a service providerclient relationship but as 15
- UN support package would end with the exit of foreign peacekeepers. 16
