Quad summit shows strengths and limits of Biden’s foreign policy

The US-crafted ‘lattice of cooperation’ in Asia is a success, but the structure has inherent limitations. The recent Quad summit was something of a victory lap for President Joe Biden’s Asia strategy. Despite global challenges – Afghanistan, Ukraine and Gaza – the Biden administration has strengthened US alliances and partnerships in the region almost beyond recognition. Raising the Quad to leaders’ level and holding four in-person leaders’ meetings is just one achievement in what US National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan has described as building a “latticework of cooperation”. The “latticework” terminology, which has also been taken up by Australian Deputy Prime Minister Richard Marles, refers to more flexible cooperation with greater connections between US allies: for example, between Japan and Australia, or Japan and the Philippines. Beyond the Quad, the Biden administration has supported Aukus, involving Australia and the UK and the “Squad”, a group involving Australia, Japan and the Philippines, primarily aimed at supporting Manila in the South China Sea. Under Mr Biden, the US has put ties with South Korea back on a sturdier footing, as well as revitalised trilateral cooperation with South Korea and Japan. All of these efforts have been successful on their own terms. The Quad, despite persistent questions about its ability to deliver anything practical, sends a strong message to China that it will not have things all its own way. It also shows that US Indo-Pacific strategy is in line with that of other leading Asian countries, such as India and Japan, not “going against the trend of the times” as Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi has contended. Deep but not wide Yet the success of the Biden administration’s approach to deepening ties with a small group of capable partners has also been its limitation. The three Quad partners together accounted for nearly 40 per cent of US high-level diplomatic activity in the Indo-Pacific, tracked by the Lowy Institute for the 2024 edition of the Asia Power Index, released this week. The US had no engagement at secretary of state or presidential level with 11 of 27 other countries in the region. Contrast this to China, which engaged with all but two countries covered by the latest Lowy survey. US defence engagement likewise has doubled down on alliances, especially with Japan. Of the nearly 500 combined training activities that the US held with regional partners in 2022 and 2023, more than 330 involved Japan. And around 70 per cent of US defence meetings were held with its five treaty allies: Australia, Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, and Thailand. This matters because unlike in Europe, where most countries are US treaty allies through Nato, in Asia, allies are the exception, not the rule. Non-aligned countries are the numerical majority and the centre of gravity at the heart of regional institutions such as Asean. This basic maths points to an inherent limitation in the Biden administration’s Asia strategy: success with a few partners cannot translate into a strategy for winning over non-aligned Asia, which would require much more comprehensive economic and diplomatic outreach to a wider range of partners. Reflecting this dynamic, in 2024, the US slipped to third place for the diplomatic influence measure of the Asia Power Index. US, China and the rest And while Japan and India are both important countries in Asia, the Asia Power Index suggests that neither is a peer competitor to China. In fact, the yawning gap between the US and China on the one hand, and India and Japan on the other, might surprise many. The Asia Power Index metrics show Japan and India each have only around half the power that China does. Australia is smaller still. These relativities, which are often overlooked, matter because they mean that despite its rhetoric around a “latticework of partnerships” and partners playing a greater role in contributing to regional security, the US remains indispensable to preventing China from achieving primacy in Asia, which would be fundamentally at odds with the region’s interests. Japan is playing a more active defence and security role, Australia is stepping up in the Pacific, and India is seeking to become an independent and powerful pole of the Global South. But without the US, China would still dominate East Asia. The next US administration – whether led by Donald Trump or Ms Kamala Harris – will probably try to emulate some of Mr Biden’s Asia policies. After all, it was under Trump that the Quad first met at foreign minister level. And Ms Harris has often been deputised to travel to Asia over the past four years – in fact, she has visited every US ally except for Australia. However, doubts remain. Trump has likened alliances to insurance policies: Would he and his team truly invest in carefully nurturing nascent groupings like the Quad, especially when the Quad has been at pains to avoid a confrontational approach to China? And would a Harris team have the same expertise and sustained focus on Asia as the Biden team – led by Mr Sullivan and Deputy Secretary of State Kurt Campbell? The Quad summit on Sept 21 is a well-deserved victory lap for President Biden. But there should be no doubt that the competition with China is far from won.