What Is the Perception of Defence Industrial Partnerships with the EDTIB by Non-EU Countries? The US Perspectives: Transforming European Defense By 2030

PERSPECTIVES The Default: US Hub and Global Spokes As the preeminent power after World War II, the United States built up cooperation with allies and partners via a US hub and global spoke model that reinforced the centrality of the US Defense Industrial Base (DIB) while allowing for cooperation with allies and partners at a range of levels of integration1. [...] The view of populist critics of NATO or the war in Ukraine is a subset of the hub-and-spoke model even though it strongly clashes with the traditional US approach to allies and partners. [...] Outside of AUKUS, US efforts in the region, such as the Partnership for Indo-Pacific Industrial Resilience are not as institutionalised or 6 idem 7 For example, the AUKUS export control reforms allow license free transfers for many ITAR regulated technologies so long as the transfers take place within the territories of the Australia, the United Kingdom, or the United States. [...] Both the NDIS and the Defense Supply Chain report released on the eve of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine acknowledge that the US industrial base cannot meet all the needs of the US military in a timely manner which can result in compounding difficulties when multiple customers are competing for the same end items or components. [...] Intra-EU Defence Trade and Procurement The individual components of the EDIS include a range of promising and challenging ideas for US policymakers, but these elements tend to be dismissed given the size of the gap between EDIS aspiration and present spending patterns as well as the limitations of the EU funding on the table to achieve these goals.