The contents of the document are within the sole responsibility of the authors and can in no way be taken to reflect the views of the EU. [...] For example, the BRI Drivers and aims: managing builds on Beijing’s domestic regional economic vulnerability and risk growth strategies such as the Great Western Development Strategy, the Strategy for the Rise Some argue that the primary function of the BRI of Central China and the Northern Revitalization is to provide a ‘favourable external environment Strategy, and the the 2002 ‘Going Out’ strat. [...] Of these, the port and The CPEC is intended to secure the passage of the road connecting it to national arteries, the China’s oil and petrol imports from the Middle development of a ‘smart city’ and the training East by avoiding existing routes through the institute have been completed. [...] After the first BRI forum, towards the end Myanmar Corridor and the China– of 2017–early 2018, the BCIM was replaced by Myanmar Economic Corridor the China–Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC), due to China’s frustration over the slow progress The Bangladesh–China–India–Myanmar (BCIM) of the discussions and India’s opposition to the Corridor was originally conceived by a Bangladeshi BRI, and the gener. [...] The lack of connectivity overseas, made at the UN General Assembly in between the north and south of the country September 2021, though the Chinese embassy in is an obstacle for both the country’s transit Islamabad has argued that Gwadar predates the potential and the export of raw materials to pledge and is not a ‘new’ project (Ebrahim, 2023).
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Table of Contents
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- Display items 6
- Acronyms 8
- Executive Summary 9
- Case studies of Chinese investment under the BRI 10
- Key takeaways 11
- What to watch 12
- The BRI in context 13
- What is the BRI? 13
- The BRI: evolution, drivers and aims 15
- Drivers and aims: managing vulnerability and risk 15
- Evolution of BRI economic corridors 21
- The China–Pakistan Economic Corridor 23
- The Bangladesh–China–India–Myanmar Corridor and the China–Myanmar Economic Corridor 25
- The New Eurasian Land Bridge (NELB) 28
- The China–Mongolia–Russia Economic Corridor (CMREC) 31
- The China–Central Asia–West Asia Corridor (CCAWA) 31
- The China–Indochina Peninsula Economic Corridor (CICPEC) 35
- Trends in China’s overseas infrastructure finance, connectivity and trade 38
- China’s overseas infrastructure finance 38
- Trends in connectivity and trade 45
- BRI investments: case studies 49
- Ethiopia: potential unfulfilled 49
- Cambodia: successful balancing act 51
- Pakistan: mixed picture 53
- Kyrgyzstan: mission unaccomplished 57
- Key takeaways 64
- Impact on connectivity and trade 64
- Contribution to economic objectives of developing countries 64
- Achieving China’s domestic economic objectives 65
- What to watch 66
- References 68
- Figure 1 BRI connectivity 14
- Figure 2 Countries that had signed BRI memorandums of understanding (MoUs) by 2017 (56 countries) 17
- Figure 3 Countries that had signed BRI memorandums of understanding (MoUs) by 2023 (149 countries) 17
- Figure 4 Internationalisation of RMB 19
- Figure 5 Belt and Road Initiative corridors 21
- Figure 6 CPEC Project Status 24
- Figure 7 Status of Chinese-financed projects in 2010–2017 (nominal USD) 25
- Figure 8 China–Myanmar Economic Corridor 26
- Figure 9 Status of Chinese-financed projects in 2010–2017 (nominal USD). 27
- Figure 10 Status of Chinese-financed projects in Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan in 2010–2017 (nominal USD) 29
- Figure 11 New Eurasian Land Bridge corridor 30
- Figure 12 Status of Chinese-financed projects in 2010–2017 (nominal USD) 30
- Figure 13 China–Mongolia–Russia Economic Corridor 31
- Figure 14 China–Central Asia–West Asia Corridor 33
- Figure 15 Status of Chinese-financed projects in Central Asia in 2010–2017 (nominal USD) 34
- Figure 16 China–Indochina Peninsula Corridor 36
- Figure 17 Status of Chinese-financed projects in 2010–2017 (nominal USD) 37
- Figure 18 Composition of China’s overseas finance, by creditor (2009–2017) 39
- Figure 19 China’s overseas policy bank lending by sector, 2008–2021 40
- Figure 20 China’s overseas official lending by sector, 2008–2021 42
- Figure 21 China’s overseas lending by region 43
- Figure 22 Largest recipients of finance in power and transport sectors, by country, 2009–2021 44
- Figure 23 China’s exports to the world and to BRI countries in 2013–2022 45
- Figure 24 China’s exports to selected countries in 2013–2022 46
- Figure 25 China’s exports to BRI countries, the US, the EU and Japan 47
- Figure 26 China’s annual import and export flows with the world 48
- Figure 27 China’s imports from selected countries, 2013–2022 48
- Figure 28 Pakistan power generation mix, 2022 54
- Figure 29 Chinese energy investments in Pakistan, 2015–2023 55
- Figure 30 GDP vs sale of electricity 56
- Figure 31 FDI inflow in Kyrgyzstan in 2010–2021 (total and from China) 59
- Figure 32 Chinese development finance in Kyrgyzstan (2000–2017) 60
- Figure 33 Kyrgyzstan trade with China 2013–2022 61
- Figure 34 Kyrgyzstan’s GDP by types of economic activity (percentages) 62
- Table 1 BRI corridors, Maritime Silk Road and their aims 22
- Table 2 Top 5 recipients of lending in the transport and energy sectors, 2009–2021 44
