We Can See Clearly Now: The Limits of Foresight in the pre-World War II Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA)

At minimum, there must be a complementary recognition of the problem and risk of “choosing wrongly” or overstating the putative benefits of any particular development pathway. [...] The Fog of Transformation In the transformation discourse, the archetypal worst-case scenario is an “RMA breakout” by an adversary, culminating in an operational surprise of strategic significance. [...] Today the failure of the Allied powers to have transformed their own militaries sooner and more thoroughly is regarded with a mixture of surprise and disdain. [...] What was the appropriate role and mix of armor, infantry, mechanized infantry, and artillery assets in ground operations? How should these be combined and what operational concepts should govern their use? Similar questions applied in the realm of airpower (regarding fighters, ground support aircraft, and long-range bombers) and naval power (regarding aircraft carriers, surface combatants, and sub. [...] Larger issues were unsettled as well: how should ground, air, and naval power be integrated? Regarding war dynamics: on the eve of the western war in spring 1940, analysts still were debating the relative potential of offensive and defensive operations in a conflict 2 between capable and well-prepared peers.