We conduct a survey experiment with a large, politically representative sample of U.S. consumers (5,205 participants) to study how perceptions of the U.S. Federal Reserve’s (Fed) political stance shape macroeconomic expectations and trust in the Fed. The public is divided on the Fed’s political leaning: most Republican-leaning consumers believe the Fed favors Democrats, whereas most Democrat-leaning consumers perceive the Fed as favoring Republicans. Consumers who perceive the Fed as aligned with their political affiliations tend to (1) have a more positive outlook on current and future economic conditions and express higher trust in the institution, (2) show greater willingness to pay for and are more likely to receive Fed communications, and (3) assign significantly more weight to Fed communications when updating their inflation expectations. Strong in-group favoritism generally amplifies these effects. Finally, if Trump were elected U.S. president, consumers would overwhelmingly view the Fed as favoring Republicans. The proportion of consumers viewing the Fed as an in-group would remain stable, but its composition would shift: Democrat-leaning consumers would see the Fed as less of an in-group, whereas more Republican-leaning consumers would perceive it in this way. Likewise, overall public trust in the Fed would remain steady, but trust among Democrat-leaning consumers would decline significantly, whereas it would rise among Republican-leaning consumers.
Authors
- Acknowledgements & Disclosure
- We would like to thank Peter Andre, Yan Chen, Andreas Fuster, Giorgio Topa, and Johannes Wohlfahrt for helpful comments and suggestions. The research described in this article was approved by the University of Birmingham Ethics Review Committee. The Randomized Controlled Trial (RCT) is registered at the AEA RCT Registry (# AEARCTR- 0014566). This research was funded in part by the Fama-Miller Center for Research in Finance at the University of Chicago Booth School of Business. The views expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Bureau of Economic Research.
- DOI
- https://doi.org/10.3386/w33071
- Pages
- 61
- Published in
- United States of America
Table of Contents
- Introduction 4
- Survey design and data 9
- Experimental design 9
- Sample composition 12
- The role of inter-group preference in belief gaps 13
- Perceived leaning of the Fed, trust, and in-group favoritism 13
- Belief gaps 16
- The role of intergroup preferences and in-group favoritism 18
- Information demand 18
- Information processing 22
- A hypothetical scenario: Trump wins the election 28
- Conclusion 31
- Additional Tables and Figures 34
- Reasoning behind the perceived political leanings of the Fed 41
- Reasoning behind the Fed favoring Democrats 41
- Reasoning behind the Fed favoring Republicans 41
- Heterogeneities in information processing 43
- Time-spent on news 47