Let Ej,t(p, NB) represent the value of employment for the worker, Uj,t the value of nonemployment for the worker, and Jj,t(p, NB) the value of a filled job for the firm. [...] The match surplus now accounts for the possibility of job-to-job mobility and hinges on the ability of the firm-worker pair to capture a share of the surplus gap between the current firm and the poaching firm. [...] In the lower part of the distribution, the positive effect outweighs the negative one, increasing the value of the joint surplus. [...] In the upper part of the distribution, the nega- tive effect dominates the positive one, reducing the value of the joint surplus. [...] In this scenario, the current employer, the worker, and the poaching firm would negotiate a new salary for the worker and a compensation for the former employer, similar to the system used in the soccer market.
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Table of Contents
- 1 Introduction 3
- 2 Toy model 4
- 2.1 Environment 4
- 2.2 Laissez-faire Bertrand competition 5
- 2.3 Non-compete clauses 7
- 2.4 Transfer fees 8
- 2.5 Corollaries 10
- 3 A life-cycle model with endogenous job creation and 12
- 3.1 Main assumptions 12
- 3.2 Joint surplus representation 15
- 3.3 Laissez-faire Bertrand competition 16
- 3.4 Transfer fees 17
- 3.5 Joint surpluses 19
- 3.6 Age-dynamics of matching and training and the role of transfer 20
- 4 Quantitative analysis 23
- 4.1 Data 23
- 4.2 Calibrated parameters 24
- Description Parameter Value 25
- Age of entry into the labor market 20 25
- Age of exit from the labor market 60 25
- Discount factor 0.99 25
- Lower bound of the Pareto distribution of productivities 0.15 25
- Upper bound of the Pareto distribution of productivities 1.50 25
- Home production 0.40 25
- 4.3 Estimated parameters 25
- 4.4 Model vs. Data 26
- 5 The impact of transfer fees on labor market equilib- 30
- 5.1 Time-Limited entitlement to compensation 31
- 5.2 Unlimited entitlement to compensation 32
- 6 Discussion and conclusion 35
- References 36
- Appendix 38
- A Proof of Corollary C 38
- B Value fonctions and joint surpluses 42
- B.1 Joint surplus - Type 0 - Equilibrium without transfer fees 44
- B.2 Joint surplus - Type 0 - Equilibrium with transfer fees 47
- B.3 Joint surplus - Type 1 - Equilibrium without transfer fees 50
- B.4 Joint surplus - Type 1 - Equilibrium with transfer fees 53
- B.5 Joint surplus - Type 2 - Equilibrium without transfer fees 56
- B.6 Joint surplus - Type 2 - Equilibrium with transfer fees 59
- C Labor market flows 62
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