Russia’s Enduring Presence in the Middle East

Table of Contents

• Russia’s Enduring Presence in the Middle East 1
• A Long Record of Engagement in the Middle East 1
• Looking for Friends Old and New 2
• The Syrian Breakthrough 3
• A Three-Legged Stool 5
• Russia and Israel: A Broken Bromance 5
• The Russian-Israeli relationship has been seriously altered by the October 7 Hamas terrorist attack and Russia’s deepening dependence on Iran. Before October 7, the Israeli government had navigated a careful line that entailed not providing lethal military support to Ukraine, avoiding antagonizing Washington by refusing to provide a sanctuary for high-profile members of the Putin regime targeted by Western sanctions, and safeguarding relations with the Russian military to preserve the Israeli Air Force’s freedom of action over Syria. Russia’s response to the October 7 Hamas terrorist attack placed significant strains on the relationship that persist as of this writing. Putin had remained initially silent and did not offer condolences to Netanyahu until October 16. On October 26, Russia hosted a high-level Hamas delegation in Moscow, adding to the shock of Israeli society. In an apparent, deliberate attempt to legitimize Hamas, shortly after the attack, the Russian ambassador to Israel noted that Hamas remained a “political force” in most of Palestine and committed to maintaining contacts with it. A short while later, Russia’s ambassador to the United Nations denied Israel’s right to self-defense as an “occupying state.” In February 2024, Russia hosted an “intra-Palestinian” meeting in Moscow with representatives from the Palestine Liberation Organization, Hamas, and Islamic Jihad. Amid U.S.-led efforts to prevent the conflict from spreading beyond Gaza in the weeks and months following October 7, the Kremlin’s actions appeared, at best, cynical and self-serving and, at worst, disruptive. Russian state propaganda was quick to scorn Israeli military activity and to whitewash Hamas’s responsibility for savage attacks on Israeli citizens and the seizure of 251 hostages. The Kremlin’s propaganda blitz sought to denigrate the Joe Biden administration in the eyes of the Global South and to exploit the alleged double standard between U.S. and European support for Ukraine and the Western endorsement of Israel’s right to self-defense. Russian narratives about Gaza also embraced a version that appeared to suit the Kremlin. For example, on October 9, 2023, Medvedev claimed that Western-supplied weapons had been smuggled from Ukraine to Israel’s enemies in the Middle East. Less than a week after October 7, Putin warned against Israeli siege tactics in the Gaza Strip, comparing such moves to the Nazi siege of Leningrad during World War Two. Russian news outlets doled out antisemitic tropes, and Russian government officials and media representatives accused Israel of war crimes and genocide in an attempt to diminish the significance of Russian atrocities in Ukraine. In January 2024, Russia hosted a Yemeni delegation from Ansar Allah (commonly known as the Houthis) to discuss how to “pressure” the United States and Israel to end the war in Gaza. In subsequent discussions, the Kremlin was reportedly offered safe passage for its ships in the Red Sea. In summer 2024, Putin pointedly threatened to send long-range weapons to various parts of the world to hurt the countries backing Ukraine, an announcement that was soon followed by reports that Russia was poised to ship weapons to the Houthis. The Wall Street Journal reported In October 2024 that Russia had worked with Iran to supply satellite targeting data to the Houthis in connection with their attacks on Western shipping in the Red Sea. The burgeoning arms trade between Moscow and Tehran has been a major concern for Israel, as Russia has committed to supply advanced air defense systems to Iran in exchange for Iranian deliveries of drones and artillery shells for the Russian war effort in Ukraine. Following Iran’s unprecedented long-range missile strikes against Israel in April 2024, the Israeli Air Force knocked out parts of Iran’s vaunted Russian S-300 vaunted air defense system. A follow-on series of strikes in October 2024 reportedly did additional damage to Russian-supplied air defense systems at sensitive locations. A wider war between Iran and Israel would be an unwelcome prospect for Russia. It would highlight Russia’s lack of capabilities to even credibly threaten to intervene on behalf of Iran, in contrast to the United States’ military presence in the region and record of unprecedented support for Israel. Still, Russia has reportedly continued to meet the key Israeli requirement for their bilateral relationship—the ability for the Israeli Air Force to operate over Syrian airspace and conduct strikes against Hezbollah and Iranian targets without interference. An S-300 missile was fired at Israeli jets over Syria in July 2022, presumably by Russian personnel, without hitting any Israeli aircraft. The launch may have been a deliberate warning to Israel. In October 2022, Russia withdrew its S-300 from Syria as part of the drawdown intended to bolster Russian capabilities in Ukraine. Israel, for its part, continues to refrain from active criticism of Russia. 6
• Beyond the Big Three 7
• What Next? 8
• PROGRAM 9
• Middle East 9
• PROGRAM 9
• Russia and Eurasia 9
• AUTHORS 9
• More work from Carnegie 10