NSW RFS October 2013 Consolidated Section Fires Report_final version

AWARENESS AND WARNINGS OF THE SPECIFIC FIRE The first awareness of the fire in all locations (from both the interviews and the online survey) was overwhelmingly from physical cues: smoke, smell and hearing water-bombing aircraft. [...] Once the interviewees knew a fire was in the area, ‘official information’ became very important and the major problem reported was the lag in such official information becoming available – especially for households near the point of origin of the fire. [...] WHAT PEOPLE DID BEFORE AND DURING THE FIRE, AND WHY For those directly affected by the fire, the online survey showed for 40% (slightly more in the case of the interviews) of households, everyone left once the fire threatened. [...] There was some concern, however, from those in areas outside the Blue Mountains (and even from the smaller areas in the greater Blue Mountains like Dargo) that they were not being given the necessary information because of the threat of the fire in Mount Victoria and the Springwood area – specifically, the concern with the ongoing threat being presented by the State Mine fire over a protracted per. [...] In the ‘General Feedback’ section, some were critical of (to them evident) confusion in decision making and a lack of communications between Headquarters and Incident Management Teams and the volunteers, a feeling that during the fire they did not get the support they needed on the fire line.