Coherent Identifier About this item: 20.500.12592/d8rvxb

Revisiting 'Minimal Nuclear Deterrence': Laying the Ground for Multilateral Nuclear Disarmament

10 June 2022

Summary

In particular, 1968 Treaty on the Non Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (Non Proliferation there is scope for reducing the Treaty, NPT), the former arguments build on the 2017 Treaty on the Pro vast Russian and United States hibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW), which rejects nuclear deterrence nuclear arsenals, which risk as inherently illegal and immoral. [...] At the same time, the crisis has highlighted the inherent fragility of recommendations on how to nuclear deterrence, awakening the world to the danger of large scale nuclear address such strategic escalation for the first time since the end of the cold war. [...] This problem can be illustrated by the recent expansion of nuclear forces in China, as its traditional nuclear restraint had long been viewed as the prime example of minimal nuclear deterrence in practice.4 Therefore, in addition to the challenge of moving towards minimal nuclear deterrence in Russia and the USA, the paper also discusses changes in Chinese nuclear policy. [...] The nuclear arsenals of Israel and North Korea, which do not officially subscribe to minimal nuclear deterrence, are even smaller.13 Alternatively, some analysts define the minimum in terms of the aggre gate yield of a given country’s nuclear arsenal, which according to one pro posal would be 512 kilotons.14 One of the most recent definitions of minimal nuclear deter rence—or what the author refer. [...] In addition to seeking to match the other side in terms of the number and quality of its nuclear weapons, the Soviet Union and the USA perceived a constant need to modernize their nuclear forces to reduce their vulnerability to the other side’s counterforce attacks and to increase their own potential to conduct such attacks.53 At the same time, it was clear that in reality there could be no winner.

Authors

Pages
28