T he C CP is fully aware o f this and exploits i t as p art o f its diplomacy and negotiating s tyle (the reverse o f this coin is that those w ho do not o end their C CP i nterlocutors a re awarded t he a ccolade of b eing ‘good f riends’ of the P RC. [...] But the a lternative is to acquiesce to t he CCP’s vision o f the future and, in t he long t erm, to e rode the four pillars of free and open countries’ way of l ife: national security, long term economic prosperity, values and data. [...] Yet the PRC’s financial c ontribution to the WHO (0.2% in 2019, now risen to 1.43% in 2021) is miniscule compared to that o f Germany, t he United 6 For a full d iscussion o f this, w hich looks a t the six a spects of exports, investment, financial and other services, tourism, students, and climate c hange cooperation, s ee: C harles P arton, ‘Empty threats? Policymaking a midst Chinese p ressure. [...] 7 The C CP has a ttempted to use the ‘16+1’ grouping of central and eastern European countries 8 t o persuade many t hat C hinese investment in the region is sizable and beneficial. [...] W hile i t eschews f ormal alliances a nd vilifies blocs, the CCP is p ushing the international r each o f organisations a nd concepts which it h as established or leads: BRICS, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, the Belt and Road Initiative, t he Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, the F orum o n China-Africa Cooperation, t he Global S ecurity I nitiative and the Global Development Initiati.
- Pages
- 8
- Published in
- United Kingdom
