what risks are being protected against), and the extent of the threats is also unclear (consider, for example, the various Chinese Talents Plans, which incentivize "individuals engaged in research and development in the United States to transmit the knowledge and research they gain [in the US] to China in exchange for salaries, research funding, lab space, and other incentives."1). [...] 26, 2021, the University of California Office of Ethics, Compliance, and Audit Services hosted the research security virtual symposium Protecting the Research Enterprise—Transparency, Integrity & Reciprocity, in coordination with the US Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) to, in part, "develop a balanced understanding of threats to the American research enterprise and the collaborative research. [...] We want to be clear that CNI is not taking a political stance on these developments and the primary purpose of the convening is not to debate their merits; our goals in organizing this Roundtable are to understand what is happening, explore likely scenarios for the coming years, and to consider how best to position our institutions and the broader system of scholarly communication to respond to th. [...] • The implications of the splintering of the Internet along national boundaries or blocks of allies (sometimes referred to as “splinternet”), the blocking of various network services and resources, and their implications for research, instruction, and the communication of scholarship, particularly in light of the student diaspora already discussed (see, for example, bullet. [...] • Finally, while the focus here is on science and technology, we should be mindful of the implications for the humanities and social sciences, and to recognize that a great deal of social science data and research have national security (and perhaps science nationalism) implications, and may want to touch on some of these implications.
- Pages
- 16
- Published in
- United States of America
