Report No MINORITY New edition RIGHTS rice £2.50 GROUP

from the NNC informed the Governor of Assam of the result of the plebiscite, and was told in return that the government could not For the N agas this was the crux of the agreement, and they read it as recognize it. [...] For the Indian government, on the other hand, the ceasefire was no more The end of the ceasefire than an opportunity for those who favoured peace in Nagaland to persuade the Federal Nagas of the hopelessness of their cause, and In spite of this complete break-down in the search for a political of the positive benefits that would accrue from general acceptance settlement, the ceasefire at first con. [...] The Indian government unilaterally terminated Indian government give the N agas the opportunity to participate the ceasefire from 1 September 1972, following an assassination voluntarily in the Indian Union (that is, to accede to it), on the attempt on the life of the Chief Minister of N agaland, and banned understanding that the N agas would do just that; while on the other the NNC. [...] By that time the UDF government in Kohima had been brought down, the pattern of THE SITUATION IN 1980 defections to the centre-favoured NNO reflecting the same sort of political suborning as was extending the grip of the Indira Gandhi The outsider looking at Nagaland at the beginning of the 1980s faction of the Congress Party in other states. [...] Accord's three sections the Naga signatories confirmed 'uncondi- Whereas in the period from India's independence in 194 7 into the tional acceptance' of the binding extent of the Indian constitution late 1960s it was at first only the N agas and then the N agas and the over N agaland; in the second it was agreed that the weapons of the Mizos who contested the Indian state's claims to inclusiveness.