BLAVATNIK SCHOOL OF GOVERNMENT WHEN MISSIONS FAIL: LESSONS IN ‘HIGH

7 was made clear long ago that this whole set of arguments is highly misleading – about the nature of the British state, about the politics of technology, and even about the narrow issue of Harold Wilson’s plans for modernisation.5 Britain was not lacking in science and technology in the immediate post-war period, but was, on the contrary, the scientific and technological leader of Western Europe;. [...] More generally, while the Ministry of Technology (Mintech), established by Labour in 1964, was in effect a recreation of the Ministry of Supply at the peak of its powers, though tasked with the redeployment and the reduction of the warfare state. [...] 17 a biased endorsement of the AGR and one unlikely to be challenged because of the power the AEA wielded.26 While Treasury officials did question why the Boiling Water Reactor (BWR) was so costly to build in Britain, and how the AGR had become so economically competitive so quickly, they also believed that they lacked the technical expertise to challenge the claims of the Central Electricity Gene. [...] In the mid-1960s, the Labour government wanted to cancel the TSR-2, a military jet, and Roy Jenkins, when Minister of Aviation, warned the Cabinet that the British Aircraft Corporation (BAC) could not survive the ‘dual blow’.33 The wider calculations about Britain’s place in the European aviation industry were important too. [...] In 1965, the scientific advisors could not provide an independent view on the claim that British-designed reactors were cheaper than American alternatives because the CEGB refused to give them the relevant information in the lead-up to the government’s decision to commit to the AGR.35 Moreover, within the electricity division of the Ministry, there was a particular worry about the design of the pr.