Bottom Line
- Denuclearization has been Washington’s North Korea policy goal since the 1990s, yet successive US administrations have failed to deter Pyongyang from developing, testing, and exporting nuclear weapons and missile technologies.
- The United States must shift its policy focus from denuclearization to arms control and reduction.
- Even though North Korea has proved to be an unfaithful negotiating partner in the past, an inspection regime that accompanies multilateral or bilateral talks with Pyongyang will cap parts of its strategic weapons program, as well as reduce stockpiles and proliferation risks.
Ask US policymakers what America’s North Korea policy goal is and they will probably tell you it is denuclearization. After
six nuclear tests from 2006 to 2017 , the likelihood Pyongyang will denuclearize is unrealistic. North Korea’s
nuclear arsenal is growing and the country’s strategic weapons capability is improving. In 2017, eleven years after its first nuclear test, North Korea declared to the world that it successfully
tested a hydrogen bomb . Considering the advances in weapons technology the United States made from its first nuclear test in 1945 to 1956, it is not too far-fetched to think that North Korea has made similar advances. On one hand, Pyongyang proved that it perfected nuclear weapons and liquid-fueled missile technologies the United States mastered in the 1950s; on the other, a 1950s-era atomic bomb delivered on a primitive missile can still ruin your day in 2023.
North Korea has not conducted a nuclear test in seven years but regularly tests missiles that could deliver them. In 2022, North Korea conducted sixty-eight
missile tests , a record number far exceeding its previous record of twenty-five tests in 2019. North Korea fired at least a dozen missiles so far in 2023, including six short-range missiles fired with Kim Jong Un
in attendance with his daughter. Repeated tests advance research and development, help North Korean missile crews improve proficiency, and these two factors combined reduce warning time and improve accuracy.
However, each time North Korea conducts a nuclear test or launches a missile, the reaction from the United States and the international community is always the same: A formal statement condemning the test from the US, South Korea, Japan, and Western governments; additional sanctions designations against North Korea and regime officials; a White House
statement that “all options are on the table,” alluding to the possible use of force; and a “show of force” military exercise, such as a B-2 bomber fly over or a US Navy
ship visit.
Unfortunately, these measures will not prevent North Korea from conducting additional missile or nuclear tests. The United States and its partners are doing the same things again and again, hoping for different results—even though Pyongyang knows exactly what to expect. And one needs to be clear: the use of force is not on the table. The United States has little deterrence credibility because North Korea can safely bet that Washington does not want to risk war on the Korean Peninsula. For decades, the conversations in the White House Situation Room following a North Korean provocation were always the same: What if the US government response leads to further escalation and conflict with the North? Even former President Donald Trump, as brash as he acted by publicly belittling Kim as
“little Rocket Man,” could not bring himself to act militarily against Pyongyang, instead deciding to meet with Kim in person.
