Submission on the National Prosecuting Authority Amendment Bill

while giving the Committee and the Minister a critical role in appointing the NDPP may require amending section 179(1)(a) of the Constitution, this does not prevent the President from involving them as a matter of practice in appointing the NDPP – and the process for appointing DNDPPs and DPPs can be altered by amending the National Prosecuting Act No. [...] Given the crucial role that the NDPP, DNDPPs and DPPs – and the Directorate’s head in particular – play in carrying out the NPA’s mandate, it is essential that the process for their appointment be designed to reduce the risk of undue political influence; and to give the public confidence that the most suitable candidates are chosen. [...] While section 12(6)(c) and (d) allow Parliament to reverse the decision to remove the NDPP, DNDPPs and DPPs, the specter of unilateral suspension and removal lying first with the President leaves the NPA open to undue influence from the executive. [...] HSF submits that the requirement imposed by section 179(4) of the Constitution that “national legislation must ensure that the prosecuting authority exercises its functions without fear, favour or prejudice”7 is as demanding of the NPA’s institutional independence from the executive as section 206(6) of the Constitution is for IPID. [...] The same role should be given to the Portfolio Committee on Justice and Correctional Services before the President is able to suspend the NDPP, DNDPPs and DPPs – and to the National Assembly as a whole, before he can remove them.