Bottom Line
- NATO’s seventy-fifth anniversary celebration in Washington, DC, this July must be more than a series of policy festivities; it must offer a strategic vision for transatlantic security amid the most challenging geopolitical landscape since the end of the Cold War.
- Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg recently traveled to Washington to plead for significant additional military, financial, and humanitarian aid to Ukraine, but neglected to address the series of planning, operational, and execution gaps that currently ail the alliance.
- Beyond the Russian invasion of Ukraine, a number of potential conflicts throughout the alliance’s European and Eurasian periphery also threaten to draw NATO or its respective members into new hot wars.
- Magnified geopolitical disruption at the nexus of Europe, Asia, and the Middle East portends a more challenging future for NATO than US and other Western political leaders seem prepared to confront.
NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg recently arrived in Washington seeking to persuade the White House and Congress to successfully negotiate legislation that would free up $60 billion to help Ukraine defend itself against Russian forces.
He
delivered his remarks on the occasion of the defensive alliance’s imminent seventy-fifth anniversary. His audience expected to hear a blueprint for readying the alliance for the next twenty years, in preparation for its hopeful centennial in 2049.
Stoltenberg first underscored the need to “ensure robust deterrence,” hailing that “NATO has implemented the most robust collective defense since the Cold War. We have more forces at higher readiness. And more capabilities to protect our people, and our territory.”
What he could not proclaim is that these force, readiness, and capabilities levels are sufficient to prevail over present and anticipated geopolitical risks confronting the alliance. Comparing today’s levels with the past offers zero insight into current and near-term will and preparedness to deter and, if needed, to compel NATO adversaries towards preferred diplomatic outcomes.
Stoltenberg then stated that “we must eliminate harmful dependencies on critical Chinese raw materials and products,” and that “we need to protect our critical infrastructure, strategic materials and supply chains. We must not lose control of our ports, railways, and telecommunications.”
According to the
Alphaliner shipping database , Chinese companies in August 2023 were invested in thirty-one European container seaport terminals, twenty-three of which are held by state-controlled companies COSCO and China Merchants, and the remaining eight by Hong Kong's privately held Hutchison Ports .
Stoltenberg’s third point was to emphasize that NATO members have added $450 billion dollars to overall alliance defense. But that figure dates back to the 2014 Wales Summit, after Russia’s initial invasion of Ukraine, not since the second invasion in 2022. He added that “ NATO Allies have committed to spending at least 2 percent of their GDP on defense. And many are exceeding that target already.”
As of July 2023,
eleven of the alliance’s thirty members were spending 2 percent of GDP on defense. Led by Poland, the United States, and Greece, the remaining countries are Romania, Hungary, Slovakia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and new member Finland. Wealthy European countries such as Germany, Italy, and Spain trail significantly, while France fell just below in the prior year.
Beyond these three key priorities, Stoltenberg was unable to deliver credible solutions to the additional manifest challenges the NATO alliance faces in this hallmark anniversary. Several weeks earlier, NATO Military Committee Chairman Admiral Rob Bauer warned against continued alliance complacency and for the need to undergo a “
warfighting transformation ” in preparation for a major European war. He stated that “the tectonic plates of power are shifting, and as a result, we face the most dangerous world in decades,” calling on NATO members to adopt greater interoperable munitions standards to replace the
current market fragmentation that has hampered speedy and adequate supplies to Ukraine.
Stoltenberg offered no insight into the
alliance’s future battlefield environments , embodied by Azerbaijan’s swift, drone-led 2020 defeat of Armenia,
intensification of electronic and unmanned vehicle warfare between Russia and Ukraine , and Houthi attacks that disrupt global shipping and Europe’s energy supply.
Acute problems have arisen in the United Kingdom, whose House of Commons defense committee warned that
British forces have been insufficiently prepared since 2010 for warfighting due to stockpile shortages, overstretched deployments, and recruitment and retention shortfalls. Nonetheless, London is prepared
to deploy an aircraft carrier to the Red Sea , in addition to its air-defense guided missile destroyer, to bolster US operations that protect shipping lanes from Iranian-sponsored Houthi missile, rocket, and drone attacks from Yemeni bases. UK Defense Minister James Heappey added that
British sovereign military bases in Cyprus have already dispatched Typhoon air power support to attack Houthi targets.
But many NATO members have been lackluster in their support for US regional operations, even after Iranian-sponsored militias in Iraq and Syria attacked US forces in Jordan, killing three American servicemembers. In December, US Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin announced the formation of Operation Prosperity Guardian, including the United Kingdom, Canada, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, and Spain. Days later,
France, Spain, and Italy withdrew , preferring instead to take action outside of US-led NATO command. French forces are coordinating with the Pentagon, ensuring the safety of French-flagged shipping and avoiding offensive strikes,
but remain under Paris’ control .
Italy’s former naval chief of staff
lamented that NATO’s inability to coordinate a joint naval response —in a region through which Europe obtains most of its energy resources—demonstrates the alliance’s weak cohesion amid a geopolitical crisis, especially as member countries fail to produce a credible alternative de-escalation strategy.
