cover image: Shield, sword, or symbol: Analyzing Xi Jinping's "strategic deterrence"

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Shield, sword, or symbol: Analyzing Xi Jinping's "strategic deterrence"

7 Mar 2024

In October 2022, Chinese Communist Party (CCP) General Secretary Xi Jinping raised eyebrows with his pledge at the 20th Party Congress to "create a strong strategic deterrent force system" (Da Zao Qiang Da Zhan Lue Wei She Li Liang Ti Xi ). The line evoked China's massive nuclear buildup, the contours of which were by then beginning to become clear. It also came less than a year after Russian President Vladimir Putin summoned his own "strategic deterrence" forces to keep NATO at arm's length in Ukraine and amid rumors that China might soon attack Taiwan. Xi's comments were not a throwaway line, since the CCP's 14th Five-Year Plan, released in March 2021, similarly called on the People's Liberation Army (PLA) to "build a high-level strategic deterrent and joint operations system" (Da Zao Gao Shui Ping Zhan Lue Wei She He Lian He Zuo Zhan Ti Xi ). Yet neither Xi nor other Chinese officials elaborated on the phrase. What were Xi's intentions and what can the answers tell us about Chinese thinking on deterrence?
china foreign policy international affairs john l. thornton china center global china project

Authors

Joel Wuthnow

Acknowledgements and disclosures
The views in this article represent only those of the author, and not the National Defense University, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. government.
Published in
United States of America

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