After the failure in the Sahel, rethinking French policy in Africa

Condemnations of French policy in French-speaking Africa have grown in recent years [1] . The grievances raised are manifold (military interventions, persistence of the CFA franc, development aid policy, restrictive visa policy, etc.) and the reasoned contestation, which focused on the objective elements of French policy in Africa described by some as "neo-colonial", has turned into an anti-French diatribe on social networks and in the simplistic rhetoric of neo-panafricanists [2] . In this context, relations between France and three Sahelian countries have been called into question within the space of two years (2021-2023). In Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger - three countries that were part of the G5-Sahel anti-jihadist coalition and hosted French and European forces as part of the fight against jihadism - the military took power and broke off the security partnership with Paris (denouncing the defense agreements linking them to Paris and demanding the departure of French troops stationed on the territory). Not only did they put an end to France's military commitment in the Sahel, but also to the military presence of the European Union (EU) [3] and the United Nations (UN) through its Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) [4] . There are no longer any French ambassadors or troops in these three countries, and Paris closed its embassy in Niamey on January 2, 2024. French official development assistance (ODA) has been suspended, as has the issuing of visas. Having broken with France, the Europeans and then the regional organizations (ECOWAS and UEMOA), which implemented sanctions, the three countries are now looking for new alliances, and have sent messages to this effect to several countries (Gulf States, Turkey, Iran, China, North Korea, etc.), with varying degrees of success to date. The Malian and Burkinabe juntas have also turned to Russia as a new security partner, as did the Niger junta in early 2024 [5] . This abrupt break and reversal of alliances is all the more surprising in that it was made by officers who had been cooperating with the French army in the fight against jihadism and, in some cases, had trained in France. Despite declarations by French diplomats tending to play down this setback, this sudden turnaround does indeed constitute a crisis. But which crisis exactly? Is it a Franco-Sahelian crisis, a Franco-African crisis, or a crisis in France's African policy? The perception of a Franco-Sahelian crisis can be justified by the fact that, out of 49 sub-Saharan African countries, only three have decided to break with Paris. Beyond the populism and neo-sovereignism displayed by the juntas, which are supposed to provide them with a social base, the reasons for these breaks with Paris are more complex. After the unanimously acclaimed Serval operation in Mali, and the implementation of the Barkhane operation in close collaboration with the countries that at the same time formed the G5-Sahel, political and security divergences between Paris and certain Sahelian capitals gradually developed [6] . While, of course, each bilateral relationship had its own specificity, particularly given that the bulk of the French army's action concerned Malian territory, two divergences became more pronounced: one over the causes of the conflict; the other over the conduct of the war. We will begin by reviewing the nature of the Sahelian conflict and these divergences, and then move on to the wider consequences for Paris of this failure in the Sahel, and the reflections required to establish a new policy. This publication is available in French: Après l’échec sahélien, repenser le logiciel de la politique française en Afrique. [1]. A. Antil, T. Vircoulon et F. Giovalucchi, « Thématiques, acteurs et fonctions du discours anti-français en Afrique francophone », Études de l’Ifri , Ifri, June 2023. [2]. A. Mbembe, « Quand le panafricanisme devient sectarisme », Jeune Afrique , January 23, 2023. [3]. End of the European Union Training Mission (EUTM) in Mali (army training), end of the Takuba task force (European special forces under the command of the French Barkhane force and the Malian armed forces), end of the EUCAP Sahel Niger mission (training of internal security forces). [4]. The last MINUSMA bases were handed over to the Malian authorities in December 2023. [5]. At the time of writing, several meetings have already taken place between Russian and Nigerien authorities (both in Niamey and Moscow) to sketch out the contours of a new partnership. As far as the deployment of Russian forces is concerned, it seems that the junta is divided on this point, see: « La perspective d’un déploiement de militaires russes au Niger divise la junte », Jeune Afrique , February 1, 2024. [6]. On this subject, you may also wish to read: Emmanuel R. Goffi, « Opération Barkhane : entre victoires tactiques et échec stratégique », Université du Québec à Montréal, June 2017 ; Rapport d’information sur l’opération Barkhane, Commission de la Défense nationale et des forces armées, Assemblée nationale, April 14, 2021 ; F. Galois, « Fin de l’opération Barkhane : réflexions sur sept ans et demi d’engagement militaire », Institut Rousseau, March 16, 2022 ; J. Guiffard, « Barkhane : échec, réussite ou bilan nuancé », Institut Montaigne, March 23, 2023.