Observations on the 2024 Unfunded Priority Lists

The White House recently submitted to Congress a budget request for defense totaling $850 billion for the fiscal year that begins this coming October 1. [i] Though consistent with the caps set in May 2023 by the Fiscal Responsibility Act, the proposed budget does not keep pace with inflation and is acknowledged even by those attempting to defend it as not enough for the long term readiness or modernization of the force necessary for our national security. [ii] The President’s budget, while important, is only the start of the legislative process that determines the final level of funding for the military. Under the Constitution, the Congress has the responsibility to “raise and support Armies” and to provide funding for that military. [iii] To do this job, the Congress has public hearings with key defense leaders, private meetings with experts, and internal deliberations among staff. It also requires submission of the often-misunderstood unfunded priority lists (UPLs). [iv] In all of these, the civilian appointees of the President are expected to hew closely to the President’s budget request. However, the military leadership is supposed to give their best professional military judgement to the Congress, even when it disagrees with the presented budget. This is why the UPL lists, with one exception, come from the uniformed military leadership to the Congress, unaltered by civilian leadership. As expected, these lists have caused tension within the Pentagon over the years, with the uniformed military taking different approaches than their civilian leaders. This year is no different. It should also be noted that Congress has been formalizing these previously informal lists more and more each year. In particular, after the Congress funds the items, they are now asking the Pentagon to brief them on how the money is spent as part of the budget submission in subsequent years: Therefore, the Committee reiterates direction included in the Joint Explanatory Statement accompanying the Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2022, and directs that any submission of unfunded requirements by the military services, defense agencies, and combatant commands with the fiscal year 2024 President’s budget request be accompanied by updated requirements and programmatic and execution plans for unfunded requirements that received appropriations in fiscal year 2023. Further, the Committee directs the Assistant Secretaries (Financial Management and Comptroller) for the Air Force, Navy, and Army to incorporate in the congressional budget brief templates distinct programmatic and execution data for appropriations provided in the previous 3 fiscal years for unfunded requirements pertaining to the program/effort. [v] Twelve lists have been made public to date this year for a total of $28.7 billion in noted budget shortfalls. [vi] These unfunded priorities equate to about 3.4 percent of the $850 billion budget request. Given that inflation remains at about 3.2 percent in the United States and the pay raise for military members is 4.5 percent, the 1 percent topline increase in the budget request, when combined with the 3.4 percent in additional funding within the UPL lists, would keep the Pentagon at a roughly zero real growth rate. [vii] Given that there are two major wars ongoing, several shadow wars, and the potential for a major conflict with China, we can expect the Pentagon may also have a 2025 Emergency Supplemental in the works. Even with this context, the UPL lists contained several interesting surprises. It should be noted that this analysis does not include Special Operations Command (SOCOM), Cyber Command (CYBERCOM), European Command (EUCOM), the Missile Defense Agency (MDA), or Africa Command (AFRICOM) as those are either not submitted or classified in total. These, however, are only a fraction of the overall list historically, and therefore their absence does not materially change the analysis. [i] US Department of Defense, Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), “DoD Budget Request,” https://comptroller.defense.gov/Budget-Materials/Budget2025/ . [ii] Fiscal Responsibility Act of 2023, Pub. L. No. 118-5. [iii] Constitution of the United States, Article I, Section 8. [iv] Brendan W. McGarry, “Defense Primer: Defense and Intelligence Unfunded Priorities,” Congressional Research Service, March 29, 2024, https://sgp.fas.org/crs/natsec/IF11964.pdf . [v] US Senate Committee on Appropriations, Joint Explanatory Statement, Department of Defense Appropriations Bill, 2023, 8, https://www.appropriations.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/DEFFY23RPT.pdf . [vi] US Department of the Navy, Fiscal Year 2025 Marine Corps Unfunded Priority List , March 19, 2024, https://insidedefense.com/document/marine-corps-fy-25-unfunded-priorities-list ; US Indo-Pacific Command , FY2025 Unfunded Priorities List , March 19, 2024, https://insidedefense.com/document/indopacoms-fy-25-unfunded-priorities-list ; US Department of the Navy, Navy FY 2025 Unfunded Priorities List , March 25, 2024, https://insidedefense.com/document/navys-fy-25-unfunded-priorities-list ; US Department of the Air Force, FY25 Unfunded Priority List , March 25, 2024, https://insidedefense.com/document/air-forces-fy-25-unfunded-priorities-list ; US Department of the Army, Army FY25 Unfunded Priorities List , March 22, 2024, https://insidedefense.com/document/armys-fy-25-unfunded-priorities-list ; US Department of the Air Force, FY25 Unfunded Priority List , March 25, 2024, https://insidedefense.com/document/space-forces-fy-25-unfunded-priorities-list ; US Northern Command, NORTHCOM Unfunded Priority List , March 19, 2024, https://insidedefense.com/document/northcomnorad-fy-25-unfunded-priorities-list ; US Central Command, Unfunded Priorities of the Armed Forces , March 27, 2024, https://insidedefense.com/document/breakdown-centcoms-fy-25-upl ; US Southern Command, U.S. Southern Command FY25 Unfunded Priorities List ($K) , March 20, 2024, https://insidedefense.com/document/southcoms-fy-25-unfunded-priorities-list ; US Space Command, CDRUSSPACECOM FY25 Unfunded Priorities List , March 22, 2024, https://insidedefense.com/document/spacecoms-fy-25-unfunded-priorities-list ; US National Guard Bureau, FY25 CNGB UPL , April 1, 2024, https://insidedefense.com/document/national-guard-bureaus-fy-25-unfunded-priorities-list ; and US Department of Defense, Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering, FY 2025 Unfunded Priority List (UPL) , March 25, 2024, https://insidedefense.com/document/pentagon-re-chiefs-fy-25-unfunded-priorities-list . [vii] US Bureau of Labor Statistics, “Economic News Release: Consumer Price Index Summary,” March 12, 2024, https://www.bls.gov/news.release/cpi.nr0.htm ; and US Department of Defense, “FY2025 Budget Request Overview Book, March 2024, 4-5, https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/FY2025/FY2025_Budget_Request_Overview_Book.pdf . Read the working paper here.