Bottom Line
- To counter the marginalization of community input in hydropower project planning, civil society organizations (CSOs) share information on the ecological and economic effects of dams during the Environmental Impact Assessment’s advised “policy window” to influence the design and approval of forthcoming projects.
- CSOs amplify this effort by fostering networks of “citizen scientists” who participate in legally required local consultations during the pre-construction phase and monitor the dams' impacts on local communities after construction. A robust social media presence also offers a vital resource to share information and mobilize support.
- In response to concerns raised by Thai CSOs, the U.S. should invest more in clean-energy development in the region, through partnerships like Mekong-U.S. Partnership (MUSP) and the Japan-U.S.-Mekong Power Partnership (JUMPP), to strengthen its strategic relationship with Bangkok and promote environmental stewardship in Southeast Asia.
The explosive growth of development along the Mekong river since 1995 has produced an
estimated 167 hydropower plants, with eleven mainstream facilities on the way in Laos, Cambodia, and along the Laos-Thailand border. With its electricity generating capacity projected to triple from 10,000 to 30,000 MW
by 2040, hydropower will continue to play a key role in regional energy initiatives to address rising energy demand. Despite these gains, hydropower has come at substantial social and environmental cost. The implementation of cascading dam releases, which disrupt the Mekong’s natural pulse, is expected to lead to a
$23 billion loss in fisheries by 2040. Additionally, the destruction of wetlands and other riverine habitats due to
sediment depletion could result in losses of up to $145 billion. These challenges have a direct impact on rural Thai communities, many of which are jeopardized by declining fish populations that serve as a primary source of food and income. Thai civil society organizations (CSOs)
argue that these ecological concerns are understated in Environmental Impact Assessments (EIAs) for hydropower projects because they rely on data from investment or construction firms that underestimate costs and overestimate benefits. In fact, hydropower is not a “clean” renewable energy, but instead increases
methane production,
riverbank erosion, and sediment and fish depletion throughout the Mekong subregion.
To advocate for communities affected by hydropower projects, Thai CSOs have developed strategies to target the early phases of project planning to influence both the design and approval processes through an information campaign detailing the full extent of ecological and social risk posed by proposed dams. By cultivating networks of “citizen scientists” who bring local insights and concerns to the local consultation process and monitoring the post-construction impacts on communities, CSOs may amplify concerns and promote more accountability. Coupled with a strong social media strategy, this approach could provide Thai CSOs with a unique advantage in not only shaping the direction of hydropower development but also in advocating for sustainable alternatives that balance energy needs with the well-being of local community members.
Challenges Facing CSOs
Thai environmental groups face a challenging landscape within the political economy of hydropower. This is largely due to the government’s vested interests in expanding hydropower as part of both a supply-side approach to energy policy and an ongoing initiative to
phase-out coal, which constitutes approximately
20 percent of Thai electricity generation. The
2023 Power Development Plan aims to source almost 50 percent of power from renewable energy by 2037 with hydropower as a staple source of electricity. In fact, there has been significant recent investment in
Lao PDR, which seeks increased hydroelectric development and regional electric integration to become the “battery of Southeast Asia.” In 2022, Thailand signed an agreement to purchase 10,500 MW from Laos PDR.
This goal of investing in more hydropower is especially puzzling given Thailand’s current energy situation with a surplus ranging between 40 to 60 percent over the last three years (the international norm is 15 percent). Many Thai CSOs contend that the push for further hydropower developments in this context is primarily driven by supply-side energy policy, embodied in power-purchase agreements (PPAs) between the Electricity Generating Authority of Thailand (EGAT) and private financiers, including banks and energy developers. Thailand's reliance on Laotian hydroelectricity stems from its projected
cost advantage over domestic sources such as natural gas and solar energy. Despite having an electricity surplus, the affordability of electricity from Laos compels Thailand to maintain an import strategy. These agreements ensure a long-term stable market for the energy generated and promise long-term revenue streams for project stakeholders. This was the case for the Pak Lay Dam PPA signed amid political distractions in 2023, which grants participants
29-year returns. Similarly, the controversial Luang Prabang dam PPA grants participants profits for
35-years. Both agreements also involved ‘
take-and-pay‘ clauses, which obligate Thailand to purchase power regardless of its actual need despite the country’s electricity surplus.
