Mapping the Arc of US Support to Ukraine: Economic, Political, and Strategic Imperatives

Introduction The US’s relationship with Ukraine has evolved since the end of the Cold War when the latter became an independent country. A crucial development came in 2014 when Russia annexed Crimea from Ukraine. Despite Russia's actions in Crimea and the Donbas conflict, the US’s response under President Barack Obama was modest at best, limited to economic sanctions and with no lethal military aid to Ukraine. Subsequently, Obama’s successor, Donald Trump, adopted a transactional approach to the relationship with Ukraine, ‘arm-twisting’ it to serve his interests. For instance, lethal aid to Ukraine was made contingent on how forthcoming Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky was on information related to Trump’s political rival Joe Biden (currently the US president) and how willing he was to launch an investigation in this regard. [1] However, the US’s relationship with Ukraine has transformed under the Biden administration. In the lead-up to the Russian military incursion in eastern Ukraine in February 2022, the Biden administration took two critical steps. First, it advanced relations with Ukraine through a joint statement on the ‘US-Ukraine Strategic Partnership’, [2] released on 1 September 2021 to mark three decades of bilateral ties. Second, on 10 November 2021, the two countries signed the US-Ukraine Charter on Strategic Partnership, which emphasised “support for each other’s sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity, and inviolability of borders constitutes the foundation of our bilateral relations”. [3] Ukraine is currently a decisive factor in the US’s foreign policy. Significantly, military, political, and economic support for Ukraine has become a metric for gauging the steadfastness of transatlantic solidarity. Since the Ukraine-Russia war began in February 2022, US support for Ukraine has acquired political hues for three primary reasons. First, there is Congressional weariness in sustained financial support to Ukraine as the war continues with no end in sight, particularly given Russia’s recent advances on the battlefield and the increasing unlikeliness of a Ukrainian victory. Ukraine’s status as a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) aspirant (but, crucially, not a member) has left the Biden administration in a bind over its inability to rationalise this expenditure to the US Congress, especially in the House of Representatives, which the Republicans control. Second, the US has encountered a mounting sovereign debt scenario in recent years, with increased government spending and enhanced borrowing, averting three government shutdowns between September 2023 and March 2024. In 2022, US foreign assistance spending reached a seven-decade high, [4] a substantial chunk of which went to Ukraine. These circumstances have created political pressure for fiscal discipline and responsible spending. Third, the Ukraine issue has inextricably linked the US’s domestic constraints to its foreign policy. Since October 2023, when the Israel military campaign in Gaza began, the Biden administration has struggled to balance the financial and military needs of Ukraine and Israel, the latter being the US’s staunchest treaty ally in West Asia. The Biden administration’s resolve to support Ukraine now appears to have been frayed by its hyphenation to the complications from the Gaza situation. This is evident from Biden’s climbdown from the “as long as it takes” position to one of “as long as we can” in the context of US support to Ukraine. [5] While support for Ukraine is a leadership bet for Biden, supporting Israel may turn into a domestic political liability amid increasing disapproval of the administration’s policies on Gaza. [6] Consequently, the Biden administration might have to alter the level of US support to Ukraine. However, restrained US support could have far-reaching repercussions, including gradual territorial loss for Ukraine and further gains by Russia on the battlefront.