Orbis Editor's Corner: Thinking About Deterrence in the 21st Century

In 1973, writing in these pages, a trio of experts based at the Los Alamos National Laboratory—W.S. Bennett, R.R. Sandoval and R.G. Shreffler—were not convinced that detente would guarantee the security of the West against the Soviet Union. They sought to explore the types of defensive posture that the United States and its allies would need to wield to deter the USSR from believing it could initiate and prevail in a conflict. Making deterrence “effective, therefore credible,” they wrote, “cannot be achieved without careful consideration of the prevailing political, military, economic and technical conditions” at play.[1] Fundamentally, the national security strategy of any country—including the United States—can be summed up in the concept of deterrence. We wish to prevent other countries from taking action that we deem injurious to our interests, while seeking to prevent—as much as possible—any limitations on our own freedom of action. Everything else, as they say, is commentary. Deterrence—to frighten someone with the consequences and costs for a particular course of action—and the Mandarin term (威慑,  wei she ), also carries this connotation of a display of power to cause another to cower—depends on the tools of statecraft and how they are wielded. The common theme running through the articles featured in this summer 2024 issue of  Orbis  is deterrence—and to examine deterrence in a much wider context. Fifty years ago, Bennett, Sandoval, and Shreffler were most concerned about how effective the deployment of “hard” power could reassure the North Atlantic alliance. Today, national security encompasses a much larger remit than military power. Writing in Orbis , Nils Schmid, the Social Democratic spokesperson on foreign policy within the  Bundestag , talked about a redefinition of alliances beyond traditional security to encompass economic, energy, environmental, health and technological matters.[2] In keeping with this approach, the articles in this issue cover the entire expanded gamut of deterrence. This issue is divided into three sections. The first covers new and emerging areas for deterrence, from human health to outer space. Given the absolute dependence on access to space for the functioning of twenty-first century societies, Kaili Ayers examines different approaches to deterrence to prevent a catastrophic collapse of the space infrastructure that we all rely on. Diane DiEuliis takes us into “inner space”—how we can bolster biosecurity as new advancements are made in biotechnology. Finally, John D. Maurer assesses how—with new technological advances, a topic that was of critical interest to  Orbis  readers in the 1970s—reliable, verifiable arms control might be strengthened. Despite the hopes that the Middle East/West Asia was on a path towards sustainable conflict reduction, events of the past year have demonstrated the complex relationship between credible deterrence and how and when state and non-state actors chose to utilize force—and under what conditions. A trio of articles by Alma Keshavarz, Anthony Celso and Jay Mens examine under what conditions deterrence functions when states, and in this case, the Islamic Republic of Iran, have access to a network of proxies who can engage in conflict but also can cloud questions of ultimate responsibility. The pieces making up the “Skirting Deterrence in the Middle East” section examine Iranian strategies, limitations on Israeli responses and the overall impact on US. strategy. This issue will be published as the full-scale Russian military campaign against Ukraine approaches its third year. To what extent is Moscow deterred by Western action and to what extent is the West limiting its responses? More importantly, what criteria are governments using in assessing costs and benefits of different courses of action? Thomas Graham tries to weigh the balance between realpolitik and messianism in the Kremlin’s approach to the world. Stephen Blank proposes an integrated deterrence strategy for Ukraine and its partners. We opened this editor’s corner with reference to the Bennett, Sandoval and Shreffler article from 1973, and their concerns that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization might falter in its mission to deter the Soviet Union. Yet NATO endures, even as the Soviet Union collapsed. Joel Hillison and Christopher Hickey distill the lessons from the successes, and failures, of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in preventing conflict and expanding the zone of security across the Euro-Atlantic region. Readers might note that this issue, despite its deterrence theme, has no particular focus on China, despite its identification in US national security strategies as the “pacing challenge.” It can be useful to discuss and debate the utility of deterrence concepts and strategies apart from a laser-like focus on Sino-American strategic competition. To paraphrase writer Walter M. Miller, Jr., we seek to determine the validity of the oyster—in this case, deterrence—in order to establish the possibility of the pearl that we can find—a way to channel competition away from confrontation. Explore the issue here [1] W.S. Bennett, R.R. Sandoval, and R.G. Shreffler, “A Credible Nuclear-Emphasis Defense for NATO,”  Orbis,  vol.17, no. 2 (Summer 1973). [2] Nils Schmid, “Germany’s Future After the Merkel Era,”  Orbis , vol. 66, no.1 (Winter 2022), https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/‌abs/pii/S0030438721000612.