The Next Front: China and Indonesia in the South China Sea

20.500.12592/5n1h7v

The Next Front: China and Indonesia in the South China Sea

27 Jan 2020

There is no territorial dispute between Indonesia and China,” has been an often-heard refrain from Indonesia’s leaders for decades. But reality belies the statement. While there may be no land dispute between China and Indonesia, there certainly is a maritime one. That was made clear in December 2019 when a Chinese coast guard vessel escorted several Chinese fishing boats into waters that are within China’s self-proclaimed “nine-dash line,” but are also inside Indonesia’s exclusive economic zone near the Natuna Islands in the South China Sea. The latest incident follows a pattern of behavior by Chinese vessels in maritime areas which China disputes with Malaysia, the Philippines, and Vietnam. Acutely conscious of that pattern, Jakarta promptly summoned China’s ambassador and issued a formal diplomatic protest. In the meantime, the Indonesian military deployed ten naval ships to the area and four F-16 fighters to Natuna Island. Indonesian President Joko “Jokowi” Widodo even flew to the island to survey the situation. For the first week of 2020, Chinese coast guard vessels and Indonesian naval ships were locked in a standoff, reminiscent of earlier ones between Chinese forces and those of the Philippines and Vietnam over the last decade. Slicing More Salami At stake for Indonesia are more than fisheries in the South China Sea and the livelihoods they provide for Indonesian fishermen. The waters north of the Natuna Islands are also critical to the future of Indonesia’s energy industry. The country’s biggest untapped natural gas field, called East Natuna and contains some 46 trillion cubic feet of recoverable gas resources, is located there. Traditionally, Indonesia has tried to sidestep its maritime row with China. Emphasizing the lack of a “territorial dispute” between the two countries, Indonesia has frequently offered to act as a neutral mediator between China and its Southeast Asian neighbors in their perennial dispute over the Spratly Islands. For its part, Beijing has been content to gloss over its overlapping maritime claims with Jakarta, especially as long as China could do little about it. The waters disputed between China and Indonesia are 1,500 km from the nearest undisputed Chinese territory; and China, until recently, has been unable to enforce its claims over such distances. But today, China’s burgeoning maritime forces and newly built military facilities in the Spratly archipelago have greatly expanded its reach in the South China Sea. As a result, China seems to have resumed its southward push through the South China Sea. Using “salami tactics”—actions designed to incrementally overcome opposition—China has already put the Philippines on its heels and seems on its way to doing the same to Malaysia and, perhaps, even Vietnam. This time, the target was Indonesia. No doubt, Beijing eventually hopes to achieve de facto control over all the waters within its “nine-dash line” claim. Confirming Suspicions China’s goal is hardly a surprise to Indonesian leaders.

Authors

Felix K. Chang

Published in
United States of America