Assessing Russian plans for military regeneration

More than two years into Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, understanding potential future Russian military capabilities is vital to predicting the Kremlin’s ability to continue to prosecute the war, or even to escalate hostilities. This research paper examines the post-February 2022 combat performance of Russian forces, identifies weaknesses and resource gaps highlighted by the war, and considers the achievability of Moscow’s plans for military regeneration and modernization. The paper looks at the implications of Russia’s underlying force structure for military effectiveness. It analyses trends in Russian land, air, naval and ‘asymmetric’ capabilities. The paper also explores the challenges for Russia’s defence industry in procuring, developing and manufacturing materiel. The overall aim of the paper is to indicate in which domains and sectors Russia will continue to be a credible military threat to Ukraine and the West. Despite serious battlefield losses and blunders over the past two years, the Russian military has proven capable of maintaining substantial tactical- to operational-level pressure along much of the front line. Russian forces appear capable of absorbing losses of personnel, and of plugging holes in the line with new recruits. At the same time, the Russian high command is undertaking large-scale reforms, intended to increase conventional military capabilities in the long term. Continued pursuit of the war in Ukraine, however, will constrain Russia’s ability to implement and integrate these reforms. Of all Russia’s military services, its Ground Forces have been the most heavily committed in the war. They have sustained the heaviest losses of personnel and equipment. As a result, their ability to regenerate will depend to an even greater extent on how and when the Russia–Ukraine war ends than is likely for other services. While the recruitment of many volunteers has improved the manpower situation, equipment losses look more difficult to sustain. Replacing equipment at sufficient volume and pace will be challenging, and Russia will struggle to conduct combined-arms operations beyond the company level effectively. However, the army has improved its reconnaissance, precision-guided munition and dynamic targeting capabilities. When it comes to air power, the resources available for recapitalization and regeneration of the aircraft and weapons of the Aerospace Forces (VKS) will be constrained by urgent demand for large-scale production of equipment in other domains to support the ongoing war against Ukraine. Consequently, for the foreseeable future, the biggest threats to NATO from Russia in the air domain are likely to remain – as now – Russia’s numerous, lethal and layered surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems, along with its growing long-range strike arsenal. Although Russian naval forces have suffered embarrassing losses at the hands of Ukrainian forces in the Black Sea, the Russian Federation Navy (RFN) remains more potent than is sometimes assumed. With two important exceptions, most of Ukraine’s naval accomplishments against Russia have involved attacks on very old or limited vessels. However, the RFN has lost none of its blue-water combat capability. Ukrainian success at sea has been impressive, but this should not obscure the fact that Russia’s global power projection capabilities are undiminished. Russia has long pursued asymmetric capabilities critical to a vision of modern, information-centric warfare – encompassing cyber tools, information and electronic warfare, unmanned and autonomous systems, counterspace operations, advanced data analytics and artificial intelligence. Since the beginning of the full-scale war with Ukraine in 2022, Russian capabilities in these areas have been tested – revealing areas of ongoing strength but also points of weakness, degradation and future uncertainty. To reduce the viability of Russia’s asymmetric approach over the long term, the West must pursue policies and strategy to further degrade Russian technological capacity and undermine the Kremlin’s informational strategy both in Russia and abroad. International targeted sanctions and the demands of the conflict have severely affected Russia’s military-industrial complex (OPK). The current situation is unsustainable for Russia: the country’s military industry is heading into a period of decline and stagnating innovation, and is having to simplify production in order to cope. This will affect the ability of Russian forces to recapitalize military hardware and modernize, and the speed with which they are able to do so. Despite the above issues, Western military planners need to remember that the OPK will probably continue to muddle through with production of ‘good enough’ systems, which will remain a significant threat to Ukraine as well as to NATO and its allies. This is especially true for stand-off and asymmetric Russian capabilities that have not yet been used in the war against Ukraine. The decline of the OPK will increasingly limit Russia’s ability to confront Western countries and NATO symmetrically in conventional and strategic competition, especially as technology becomes an even more significant element of national power. Use of more stringent and widened sanctions will be the best tool for Western militaries and their allies to ‘out-tech’ Moscow and blunt Russia’s ability to compete militarily and geopolitically. Ultimately, the single most significant factor that can impair Russia’s ability to reconstitute its military in coming years will be ongoing Western support for Ukraine. Western countries must continue to work together to provide Ukraine with arms, ammunition, financial support and refugee assistance, and to show moral solidarity with the Ukrainian war effort. Denying Russia victory and forcing it to continue in a long attritional struggle will further degrade all elements of its war-making capacity.