cover image: The Russia-Ukraine War: A Study in Analytic Failure

The Russia-Ukraine War: A Study in Analytic Failure

24 Sep 2024

This report, The Russia-Ukraine War: A Study in Analytic Failure, published by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in September 2024, critiques the pre-war analytic errors that led to an overestimation of Russian military capabilities and underestimation of Ukrainian resilience prior to the full-scale invasion in February 2022. Authors Eliot A. Cohen and Phillips O’Brien identify key assumptions that shaped Western defense analyses, including misplaced faith in Russia's military modernization, belief in Russian air superiority, and the assumption of a swift Ukrainian defeat. The report dissects how these misconceptions shaped Western military aid policies, which initially hesitated in supplying Ukraine with critical resources. The report calls for a broader reassessment of strategic analysis, emphasizing the need for curiosity, attention to intangible factors, and humility in the face of uncertainty. Lessons from this analytic failure are proposed for application in other regions, particularly concerning the military balance between the U.S. and China in the Pacific. The authors argue that false assumptions in war prediction can have long-term consequences, and highlight the importance of learning from past mistakes to improve future national security assessments.
national security defense policy intelligence failure ukrainian military strategic analysis russia-ukraine war conflict studies russian military warfare analysis military analysis

Authors

Eliot A. Cohen, Phillips O’Brien

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Pages
78
Published in
United States of America

Table of Contents

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