This report, The Russia-Ukraine War: A Study in Analytic Failure, published by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in September 2024, critiques the pre-war analytic errors that led to an overestimation of Russian military capabilities and underestimation of Ukrainian resilience prior to the full-scale invasion in February 2022. Authors Eliot A. Cohen and Phillips O’Brien identify key assumptions that shaped Western defense analyses, including misplaced faith in Russia's military modernization, belief in Russian air superiority, and the assumption of a swift Ukrainian defeat. The report dissects how these misconceptions shaped Western military aid policies, which initially hesitated in supplying Ukraine with critical resources. The report calls for a broader reassessment of strategic analysis, emphasizing the need for curiosity, attention to intangible factors, and humility in the face of uncertainty. Lessons from this analytic failure are proposed for application in other regions, particularly concerning the military balance between the U.S. and China in the Pacific. The authors argue that false assumptions in war prediction can have long-term consequences, and highlight the importance of learning from past mistakes to improve future national security assessments.
Authors
- Pages
- 78
- Published in
- United States of America
Table of Contents
- Eliot A. Cohen 1
- Phillips OBrien 1
- Hew Strachan 1
- Eliot A. Cohen 2
- Phillips OBrien 2
- Hew Strachan 2
- Foreword 6
- Reflections on Analytical Surprise 6
- The Russia-Ukraine Military Analysis Project 18
- The Estimate 20
- Assessments of the Russian Military 24
- A Modernized Combat-Tested Military 25
- What Analysts Overlooked 28
- Assessment of the Ukrainian Military 30
- Analysis of the Ukrainian Military and Ukrainian Society and Politics 31
- Corruption and Identity 32
- Assessments of the Russian and Ukrainian Militaries in the Donbas 35
- Understanding of War 39
- Policy Advocacy 44
- Methodology and Consistency 48
- The Numerical 48
- The Qualitative 49
- The Doctrinal 50
- The Experiential 50
- The Political and Social 51
- Conclusion 51
- Why the Analytic Failure 52
- The Exogenous Shock Defense 52
- The Close-Call Counterfactual Defense I Was Almost Right 53
- The Politics Is Hopelessly Cloudlike and The Low-Probability Outcome Just Happened to Happen Defenses 53
- The I Made the Right Mistake Defense 54
- Conclusion Remedies 54
- Appendix A 57
- Database of Expert Assessments of the Russia-Ukraine Military Balance 57
- Appendix B 60
- Earlier Assessments 60
- Setting the Stage Earlier Examples of Military Assessment 60
- About the Authors 64
- Endnotes 66
