In an age of artificial intelligence and weapons of high technology (and great cost), we forget that the most effective weapon system we possess is brainpower. Brainpower does not require a budget. It does require imagination and a deep understanding of the human condition—the essential elements of effective influence operations. What mattered more than firearms in the American Revolution, Civil War, and World War II was America’s ability to influence the mind and will of both friends and enemies. Leninist theory holds that political struggle against the West may vary in form depending upon circumstances, but the condition of political warfare is permanent. China’s military has developed a concept of the “battlefield beyond the battlefield” to take the struggle into the barracks, boardrooms, and living rooms of its Western enemies. The Soviet concept of “active measures” comes closest to describing and defining operations we should be conducting for two reasons. First, active measures—influence operations—are the continuance of political-military operations, but via brainpower rather than firearms. Second, when and if needed, influence operations can be included in war plans and given specific tasks with specific wartime goals or objectives. American influence capabilities have atrophied in the last thirty years. This decline has serious implications for American security given enhanced Sino-Russian efforts to isolate the United States, divide us as a people using political and psychological means, and ultimately destroy the United States. The Department of Defense must reassess the role of our influence operations and integrate them fully into American defense planning. Of immediate importance is rebuilding a strong research and analysis capability in the psychological operations and civil affairs communities with personnel having native fluency in foreign languages and in-depth knowledge of the culture and psychology of the people living in areas of operational interest.
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Table of Contents
- BOTTOM LINE 1
- In an age of artificial intelligence and weapons of high technology (and great cost), we forget that the most effective weapon system we possess is brainpower. Brainpower does not require a budget. It does require imagination and a deep understanding of the human condition—the essential elements of effective influence operations. What mattered more than firearms in the American Revolution, Civil War, and World War II was America’s ability to influence the mind and will of both friends and enemies. 1
- Leninist theory holds that political struggle against the West may vary in form depending upon circumstances, but the condition of political warfare is permanent. China’s military has developed a concept of the “battlefield beyond the battlefield” to take the struggle into the barracks, boardrooms, and living rooms of its Western enemies. The Soviet concept of “active measures” comes closest to describing and defining operations we should be conducting for two reasons. First, active measures—influence operations—are the continuance of political-military operations, but via brainpower rather than firearms. Second, when and if needed, influence operations can be included in war plans and given specific tasks with specific wartime goals or objectives. 1
- American influence capabilities have atrophied in the last thirty years. This decline has serious implications for American security given enhanced Sino-Russian efforts to isolate the United States, divide us as a people using political and psychological means, and ultimately destroy the United States. The Department of Defense must reassess the role of our influence operations and integrate them fully into American defense planning. Of immediate importance is rebuilding a strong research and analysis capability in the psychological operations and civil affairs communities with personnel having native fluency in foreign languages and in-depth knowledge of the culture and psychology of the people living in areas of operational interest. 1
- Of Sweet Potatoes and Newsreels 1
- Influencing the Willpower of Combatants 2
- So, What Makes “War,” War? 3
- The Chinese View of Influence in Warfare 3
- The Limits of the American View 4
- An American Blind Spot 5
- Where To From Here? 6
- The Last Word 7
- You May Also be Interested in 9
- Looking Out Over the Next Four Years 9
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