The ever-present possibility of a motion of no confidence against the President and the Cabinet is meant to keep the President accountable to the Assembly which elects her or him.”3 2.5. [...] Similarly, in UDM the Constitutional Court held that – “A motion of no confidence constitutes a threat of the ultimate sanction the National Assembly can impose on the President and Cabinet should they fail or be perceived to have failed to carry out their constitutional obligations. [...] While the Constitutional Court’s jurisprudence relating to MONC has been developed in the context of national government, the spirit of that jurisprudence applies to local government all the same. [...] The Bill’s proposed ‘exceptional’ MONC effectively replicates the Constitution’s provision for removing the President5 and Premiers.6 This may well attract the same drawn-out fact gathering process now germane to the process for removing the President since Economic Freedom Fighters and Others v Speaker of the National Assembly and Another.7 3.4. [...] First, when the Constitutional Court considered calls to force the Speaker of the National Assembly to conduct a vote on a MONC in the President in secret, it held that it was by no means clear when a particular voting procedure would best hold public representatives accountable.
Authors
- Pages
- 7
- Published in
- South Africa
Table of Contents
- Comments.coalitionbillcogta.gov.za 1
- 1. Introduction 2
- Bill 2
- MONC 2
- 2. Motions of no Confidence as Constant Incentives for Performance 2
- Mazibuko 3
- The Constitution does not set a time or preconditions for when the Assembly may vote 3
- UDM 3
- A motion of no confidence constitutes a threat of the ultimate sanction the National 3
- Assembly can impose on the President and Cabinet should they fail or be perceived to 3
- While the Constitutional Courts jurisprudence relating to MONC has been 3
- 3. Exceptional Motions of no Confidence 3
- Economic Freedom Fighters and Others v Speaker of the National Assembly and Another 4
- 4. The Bills Vision of Municipal Coalition Politics in South Africa 4
- 5. Excluding Minority Parties from Local Governance 4
- 6. Public Voting vs Secret Ballots 5
- 7. Binding Coalition Agreements 7
- 8. Conclusion 7
