A SSESSING THE QUALITY OF THE DIGITAL MARKETS ACT AND OTHER PLATFORM REGULATIONS How are these principles of good regulatory design manifested in the DMA and other types of regulations that focus on gatekeepers? In this Section, we will assess the European Commission’s DMA proposal (“DMA proposal”) and the newer rules in Germany, the envisaged rules in the UK and the US. [...] The recitals make an argument that concentration of platform market power and the attendant potential abuse are a consequence of the specific characteristics of the digital economy – in particular significant scale economies and network effects, the potential degree of vertical integration, and the role of data. [...] With the exception of the proposed US “Ending Platform Monopolies Act”, the other two US proposals require the FTC and the Assistant Attorney General of the Antitrust Division to “not later than one year after the enactment of the Act issue guidelines outlining policies and practices relating to agency enforcement with the goal to promote transparency and deter violations”. [...] As the DMA rationale for intervention is not tied to the market characteristics in which digital platforms operate, the link between the objective of the regulation and how adequate the regulation is to meet those objectives is severed, increasing the risk of unintended consequences. [...] In the DMA proposal, the process and criteria for defining and designating a core platform service do not seem linked to the regulatory objectives nor to the particular characteristics of platform markets that motivate the DMA in the first place (e.g.
- Pages
- 31
- Published in
- Belgium
