Uncertainty and complexity in nuclear decision-making

The risks that complexity poses to decision-making in the context of nuclear weapons include possible escalatory actions as a result of miscalculation, misperception or misjudgment. These actions could in turn lead to cascading catastrophic impacts. In times of crisis, such escalatory dynamics can be set in motion by human or machine error and influenced by individual factors such as biases, personal beliefs, culture, religion, and so on. Decision-makers at both the strategic and operational level who are tasked to take critical decisions (e.g. moving nuclear forces into positions of high alert, or deploying nuclear assets into battlefields) may not necessarily always make those decisions on rational grounds. This study applies a complexity lens to understanding nuclear weapons policy, including in nuclear decision-making, and assesses the issue of nuclear weapons policymaking as a ‘wicked problem’. Complexity can be found in many layers of international relations, including in nuclear weapons policy, nuclear weapon systems design, the security environment and individual decision-making. The interaction of these layers with each other and with other security issues requires – yet has not always received – the utmost attention within nuclear policy communities. Complexity studies may help the nuclear policy community to address arms control, nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament from alternative and new perspectives. Such studies can shed light on human processes and judgment, improving and informing future assessments and decision-making. By applying the lens of complexity, decision-makers can improve choices made and decisions taken in times of both crisis and peace. Decision-making at times of heightened tensions, however, takes place in a completely different mindset. Decision-makers are required to perform to a high standard under pressure and against a background of increased uncertainty. In crises, the human brain uses shortcuts to find solutions and acts on impulse, leading to decisions that are frequently based on intuition or ‘gut feeling’. In order to handle complexity in decision-making, a balance between reason, logic, cognition and intuition is required. Historically, data from past instances of near nuclear use have been examined through escalatory dynamics, but not much has been written on how these incidents provide information on complexity. Although each nuclear weapon state has a standard operating procedure and/or protocols to prevent unintentional escalation or accidental nuclear weapons use, case studies of the 1983 Soviet nuclear false alarm incident (also known as the Serpukhov-15 or Petrov incident), NATO’s Able Archer nuclear-preparedness exercise in the same year (henceforth referred to as ‘Able Archer-83’) and the 1995 Norwegian rocket launch incident (also known as the Black Brant scare) demonstrate that nuclear decision-making is complex and involves behavioural and psychological factors. This study takes a multidisciplinary approach to understanding how information and intuition come into play at the moment when a decision is taken in the nuclear realm. Other disciplines, such as neuroscience, social psychology and systems engineering, can further a better understanding of complexity and human judgment, and can help unpack the various roles played by psychological biases, predispositions and perceptions in influencing decision-making.