CENTRE FOR AIR POWER STUDIES - Putin’s Nuclear Brinkmanship: MAD and the Credibility Problem

Russian Nuclear Policy In June 2020, Russia released an unprecedented document, Basic Principles of State Policy of the Russian Federation on Nuclear Deterrence.1 It was the first-ever document in Russia's history giving out the finer details of the Russian nuclear strategy and the concept of nuclear deterrence. [...] The decree further states that Russia considers nuclear weapons "exclusively as a means of deterrence, their use being an extreme and compelled measure." The document clarifies that the Russian concept of nuclear deterrence is that of deterrence by punishment instead of deterrence by denial: "Nuclear deterrence is aimed to provide comprehension by a potential adversary of the inevitability of reta. [...] Some observers argued that the reference to the defensive nature of nuclear deterrence in the Basic Principles of State Policy, "inevitability of retaliation", and "guaranteed unacceptable damage" puts an end to conjecture about the offensive underpinning— a situation when Russia launches aggression and uses the threat of going nuclear to prevent western (US and NATO) intervention—of the Russian n. [...] He said that he thinks “that the threat of nuclear war is a bluff" and that the use of nuclear weapons “means the end for all sides, not just for the person using them.” While the argument might sound theoretically correct, it might not play out precisely in a crisis.11 3 CAPS InFocus 23 April 2022 The Russian political stakes in the ongoing conflict outweigh those of the Am. [...] Although the balance of nuclear forces—numerical parity of strategic warheads between Russia and the US—and the prospect of mutually assured destruction render the Russian nuclear threats less credible and irrational because any nuclear exchange would threaten even Russia’s destruction, the balance of resolve in favour of Russia provides it with a coercive bargaining advantage, if not credibility.