They were meant to act as crude support systems to further the war effort and, in the case of German development and later operationalisation of the V-1 and V-2 rockets, take last-moment pot shots at British civilian population centres.17 The US pursuit of unmanned systems in the aftermath of World War II lost steam, with the drawing 184 Journal of Defence Studies of the Iron Curtain and the focus. [...] The last of these roles was supposed to be carried out in conjunction with manned aircraft.28 The offensive role of UAVs and as relays was also visualised, but only in a theoretical manner.29 With the start of its global war on terror (GWOT) in the wake of the 11 September attacks, the US innovated and, in retrospect, perpetuated the use of UAVs in an offensive role, that is, targeted the killings. [...] The drone threat is considered as part of the CI/CT continuum, and UAVs are treated as an extension of the “bad actors”, that is, terrorists, over ground workers (OGWs), financiers and propagandists, since a majority of the incidents have involved the dropping of counterfeit currency, AK-47s, and drugs across Counter UAS Technologies for India 189 the LC and IB.64 Even the Jammu drone attack was t. [...] This is due to the comparatively high rate of fire of these guns, and the use of proximity-fuse ammunition, which detonates in the space surrounding the air threat, and exploding 190 Journal of Defence Studies in more than 1,000 pieces of tungsten shards, and thereby hitting more than one target in a swarm. [...] However, most counter-drone technology demonstrations already assume the presence of a drone, and the effectiveness of the particular technology is based on the knowledge of the same.
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