Rethinking political settlements in the Middle East and North Africa

The US, the UK and other like-minded governments are disengaging from the Middle East and North Africa to focus on conflicts in other parts of the world where they see greater threats and can exert greater influence. They argue that conflicts that once ripped through countries like Iraq, Lebanon or Libya are now being managed through political settlements (or ‘elite bargains’) that incentivize rival elites to lay down arms and govern under power-sharing political systems. But this view is flawed. International policy in these and similar contexts has prioritized stability over accountability, amid fears of a return to violent clashes or civil war. But the compromise of one form of stability achieved via elite bargains has created and perpetuated political systems that benefit those elites at the expense of citizens. As a result, many Iraqis, Lebanese and Libyans now protest against, and demand an end to, the very settlements that were meant to solve the problem of violence. This research paper argues that the logic behind such settlements is primarily concerned with curbing one form of violence – direct, inter-elite violence – and fails to account for others. These other forms include structural violence, in which elite capture, corruption and profiteering cause harm to people’s everyday lives. In each of the three countries discussed, elite bargains have successfully reduced direct violence but have not improved – and, in some cases, have worsened – corruption and human development scores. The failure to address such basic concerns means that countries like Iraq, Lebanon or Libya remain unstable and cannot meaningfully be described as ‘post-conflict’. Captured political systems are unable to address grievances or absorb greater participation from ordinary people, and are inherently more likely to lead to outbreaks of direct violence due to the inequalities they produce. When corruption is widespread, a political settlement is more likely to collapse into some form of armed confrontation. This paper proposes a revised approach to political settlements centred on increasing accountability. In particular, it suggests working with reform-oriented individuals who are technically capable and therefore indispensable in their roles across state or society. Increasing connectivity between these actors and building their capacity can help foster accountability and positive change. Ultimately, the approach proposed seeks to minimize direct violence through an inclusive political settlement that also addresses the daily harms caused by violence in all its forms.