A Dangerous New Phase in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict

James Ryan On October 7, members of the military wing of Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad launched a surprise attack on civilian and military targets in southern Israel. The scope and scale of the attack was shocking and brutal in equal measure–more than 1,400 Israeli civilians were murdered in often grotesque fashion, and more than 150 were taken hostage, a handful of them American citizens. The attack represents the largest mass murder of Jews since the Holocaust and called immediately to mind the events of the Yom Kippur War of 1973, nearly fifty years ago to the day.  The response of the Israeli military has been overwhelming thus far. In the six days since the attack, a truly shocking number of bombs—6,000—have fallen over Gaza. This is more than the United States dropped on the Syrian city of Raqqa during its months-long siege campaign against the Islamic State, and as many as fell on the entire country of Afghanistan in any single year of that conflict. A ground invasion by the Israeli Defense Forces appears to be imminent at the time of this publication. It is impossible to overstate the gravity and grotesque nature of this new turn in this century-old conflict.  At FPRI, we are working with our senior fellows and contributors to provide information and analysis of the situation that is true to our mission of a non-partisan, clear-eyed understanding of regional and global politics. The first in a series of webinars providing on-the-ground perspective and can be viewed on YouTube . Below, we have asked a group of our experts for initial reflections on different aspects of the first week of this new phase of the conflict. Please stay with us for future events and analysis across our platforms. Sam Helfont Israelis are overhauling their policies and strategies to consider not only more intense strikes against Hamas, but also a different type of war than we have seen Israel wage. Yet, despite tremendous Israeli will for an overwhelming military operation, there are no good strategic options.  Carl von Clausewitz understood that “war can be of two kinds.” The first is when one side attempts “to overthrow the enemy—to render him politically helpless or militarily impotent.” Otherwise known as war for an unlimited objective, or unlimited war. The second is a “limited” war that creates favorable conditions for “bargaining at the peace negotiations.” The strategies required for limited and unlimited war are different. A limited war can be won by wearing down an adversary’s political will. This rarely works in unlimited wars, where victory demands the physical defeat of the enemy. Those distinctions affect all aspects of the conflict. Israel has fought several limited wars against Hamas. The logic of those wars was to foster deterrence by targeting Hamas’s will to fight. Israelis thought they could manage the conflict. Some on the Israeli political right even believed that Hamas was a useful adversary because it kept the Palestinians divided and eased pressure on Israel to make political concessions. The Israeli government’s limited war policies were rooted in two assumptions. First, their superior intelligence and security capabilities offered sufficient protection. That proved incorrect. The second assumption deals with the nature of Hamas. In recent decades, much of the international community has tried to convince Israel that the genocidal anti-Semitism in Hamas’s charter and rhetoric was not representative of the organization; that Hamas had moderated its will and could keep the peace, or at least be deterred. Israelis debated these issues among themselves. It seems that Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu accepted some form of this assumption prior to last weekend. But, in the wake of last weekend’s attacks, arguments will carry little weight amongst Israelis. In recent memory, the only group to approximate Hamas’s inhumane tactics was the Islamic State (ISIS). The world was unwilling to live with the scourge of ISIS, and most Israelis have adopted a similar stance towards Hamas. With its previous assumptions shattered, Israel’s policy options are fairly narrow: overthrow Hamas, or render it impotent. However, no good military strategy exists to achieve these objectives. More intense versions of the strategies Israel employed in its limited wars against Hamas are unlikely to succeed in an unlimited war. Mass casualties are unlikely to lead Hamas to surrender. A shift to unlimited war will likely necessitate a ground campaign to take control of Gaza. This may produce short-term results, but unlike ISIS, Hamas enjoys significant support among the population. To create lasting effects, the invasion would probably become a protracted occupation. That would be extremely costly for Israel in terms of both life and treasure. An unmanageable insurgency in Gaza is something even far-right governments in Israel have feared since Israel’s withdrawal from Gaza in 2005.  As such, Israeli leaders face a dilemma. No good strategy exists to achieve the only politically acceptable objective. Carol Rollie Flynn Much has been said about Israel’s failure to detect the large-scale Hamas attack on Israel last weekend, with many characterizing it as a massive intelligence failure. The conventional view is that Israel’s intelligence services are highly capable, both in terms of their human source networks and sophisticated technical capabilities, which are augmented by its closest allies, including the United States. That the Israelis could have missed this attack was astounding to many observers.  The reasons for this intelligence failure are not yet known. However, one theory is that the Israelis simply did not believe that Hamas would have had the inclination or the capability to mount an attack of this magnitude, despite reports that Hamas had constructed a mock Israeli village on their side of the border and had been conducting training exercises simulating an attack. There have also been reports that the Egyptians warned the Israelis three days prior to the assault that “something big” was coming, sourced to unnamed Egyptian sources and public comments by Chair of the House Foreign Affairs Committee Michael McCaul. The Israelis either underestimated Hamas’s capabilities and/or did not believe Hamas intended to launch an attack.  There is also a distinct possibility that the Israelis relied too heavily on technically acquired intelligence. The Israelis have long been thought to have excellent human source networks. However, in this case, they either lacked adequate human intelligence reporting or their sources were unreliable, possibly controlled by Hamas, and/or feeding them disinformation. It is also possible that the Israelis had reliable sources, but they simply did not believe what their sources were telling them. Some Israeli commentators have also observed that the relationship between Israel and the residents of the Gaza Strip had become regularized, with many Gazan day laborers regularly crossing the border to work in Israel.