The ‘conflict economy’ of sesame in Ethiopia and Sudan

In the past three years, a combination of civil war, political turbulence and territorial rivalry has transformed the political economy of the sesame sector in Ethiopia and Sudan. The industry is no longer just a mainstay of local livelihoods in the borderlands between the two countries. It now plays a central role in a transnational conflict economy that perpetuates violence and political instability. This research paper charts these dynamics, exploring their drivers and impacts. It focuses on how different actors – including government armed forces, local elites, and militias and rebel groups in border regions – have competed for control of farmlands, sesame production and trade. The paper also proposes solutions that might help to reduce violence and promote stabilization by addressing internal and transnational conflict dynamics affecting Ethiopia and Sudan. Contested access to land and economic resources continues to fuel and sustain conflict in both countries. It has been a major factor in two destructive civil wars: in Ethiopia (2020–22) and Sudan (2023 to the present) respectively. Related pressures have also inflamed a cross-border dispute between Ethiopia and Sudan over Al Fashaga, a major sesame-producing region. These conflicts and crises have developed complex transnational dimensions, involving contradictory interests from neighbouring countries as well as other external actors. The sesame sector has become a focal point in the region’s troubles. Although sesame is in many respects an unremarkable agricultural crop, its value as a staple of local economies and livelihoods means that it has become in effect a strategic ‘conflict commodity’ – one that is embedded in local, subnational and national political contestations, and in turn implicated in the transnational conflict dynamics mentioned above. Local communities have been disrupted in numerous ways. Violence along the Ethiopia–Sudan border, and internally in both countries, has had redistributive and transformative economic effects. It has created new power-holders, and thus political and economic winners and losers. Where certain groups have captured the production and trade of resources such as sesame, they have used this to entrench political and territorial control. For example, the Sudanese army has fortified its military and economic control of border areas in Al Fashaga, capturing profits from the sesame trade to sustain its war effort. This has had harmful consequences for local Sudanese and Ethiopian farmers. Further to the east, contestation of territory in Western Tigray/Welkait has reinforced ethnic fragmentation. The displacement of local farmers and investors by Amhara elite interests has resulted in a shift in the ‘identity’ of the land from Tigrayan to Amhara. The recommendations in this paper are aimed at both domestic and international policymakers. The authors emphasize the need to consider the political economy of conflict, as well as related subnational and transnational dynamics, when developing plans for conflict mitigation and management. The implications of turbulent political transitions in both Ethiopia and Sudan also need to be factored in. Among its specific recommendations, the paper calls for policymakers and development partners to:Understand and address the transnational dynamics that trigger armed conflict. Conflict resolution cannot be considered a purely domestic matter for each country, but needs to navigate interests on all sides, some of which are often far beyond national borders.Pay attention to the economic aspects of conflict. Conflict resolution efforts should factor in the intersection of conflict with issues of political economy in both countries, including the external economic interactions that facilitate conflict.Broaden definitions of ‘conflict goods’. A legal and seemingly innocuous commodity such as sesame can generate conflict. Policymakers need to understand that conventional definitions of conflict goods – for example, illicit minerals, weapons or drugs – are inadequate on their own for informing peacebuilding and reconstruction programming in the Ethiopian and Sudanese contexts.Think beyond ‘licit’ and ‘illicit’. Smuggling is often a necessity for borderland communities due to the lack of alternative livelihood options and to impediments placed on trade by state and non-state actors. Trade outside official channels can be a vector for community survival and resilience. Policymakers should show a degree of flexibility in tolerating informal trade; they should support the regularization of trade in licit commodities because of the necessity of such trade for everyday existence.Foster ‘bottom up’ initiatives. There is a long history of local cohabitation and collaboration across the Ethiopia–Sudan border. It will be important for development partners to support the establishment and strengthening of engagement and relationships at subnational and local levels. This effort should include introducing cooperative cross-border measures that build trust, including collaborative farming and trade of sesame.Acknowledge the impact of regional relationships and external influences. Political alignments in the Horn of Africa continue to shift, partly as a consequence of a reshaping of the regional political order since 2018. Regional and international policymakers will need to accommodate this repositioning in their thinking, and in their engagement with all relevant parties, to prevent insecurity from worsening in and across border areas.Provide support for multilateral or external dialogue and mediation. There is a pressing need to prevent border tensions between Ethiopia and Sudan from escalating, as this would worsen protracted instability in both countries. It is vital for policymakers to understand which states or multilateral bodies are best placed to be effective mediators, and which are not.