“Knowing Your Enemy”: James R. Schlesinger and the Rise of Tailored Deterrence

In the years ahead, the United States will confront an unprecedented geopolitical challenge that threatens its far-flung alliances and, more directly, the security of the American homeland. For the first time in the nuclear age, the United States will face two peer nuclear adversaries, China and Russia. The bipartisan Strategic Posture Commission recently addressed this unparalleled situation, concluding that the United States “must urgently prepare for the new reality, and measures need to be taken now to deal with these new threats.” But how should the United States prepare for a two-peer threat environment? The strategic sensibility of James R. Schlesinger, a pioneering Cold War strategist who confronted the rise of a peer nuclear adversary, can help address this question. Given the confounding nature of the emerging strategic landscape, it may seem puzzling to turn to the past. Schlesinger, after all, thought and wrote about deterring just one great-power adversary. And though he faced the rise of a peer nuclear rival in the Soviet Union, the Soviets—contra China today—were isolated from the global economy and suffered from a relatively weak defense-industrial base. Notwithstanding these acknowledged differences, Schlesinger recognized a fundamental feature of peacetime competition that transcends time, space, and number of peer rivals: Adversaries hold distinctive values and behavioral tendencies that defy “rational” mirror-imaging. Moreover, a wise competitor, as Schlesinger understood, will exploit his opponent’s self-damaging proclivities to secure competitive advantages. U.S. nuclear strategy, as such, should be tailored to adversary thinking—not that of American planners. The totality of Mutual Assured Destruction—the idea that the nuclear balance is inescapably stalemated— has not nurtured a community of like-minded nuclear powers. Nor has it erased the need to compete for comparative advantage. here .